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Internal control represents a continuous process in which takes part the 
board of directors, senior management and all level of personnel, and whose 
aim is to ensure that all the established goals wil l be reached. The main 
objectives of the internal control process are: efficiency and effectiveness of 
activities; reliability, completeness and timeliness of financial and 
management information; compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
In this study, COSO evaluation model was used in order to make an 
evaluation on the effectiveness of internal control systems of Turkish banks, 
covering all regulations stipulated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. As the impact of each of the banking function on the 
effectiveness of internal controls were investigated, it was shown that an 
efficient internal control system might have prevent or detect from time the 
problems that led to losses, or that at least could have limit their value. 
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ÖZET 
İç Kontrol, belirlenen tüm hedeflerin gerçekleşmesini sağlayan; Yönetim 
Kurulu, Üst Düzey Yöneyiciler ve tüm seviyelerdeki personeli içinde 
barındıran devamlı bir uygulamayı temsil eder. İç Kontrol'un temel 
amaçları: aktivitelerin etkinlik ve verimliliği; güvenilirlik, finansal ve 
yönetim verilerinin bütünlüğü ve zamandan muaf oluşu; uygulanan yasa ve 
regülasyonlarla uyumluluğudur. Bu araştırmada, Basel Bankacılık Gözetim 
Komitesinin tüm regülasyonları göz önünde bulundurularak COSO 
değerlendirme modeli, Türk bankalarındaki İç Kontrol mekanizmalarının 
verimliliğini ölçmek için kullanılmıştır. İç Kontrol'un bankacılık 
fonksiyonlarındaki etkinliği araştırıldıkça etkili bir İç Kontrol 
mekanizmasının kayıplara sebep veren sorunları önlediği veya en azından bu 
sorunların değerlerini sınırlandırdığı görülmüştür. 
IV 
T A B L E OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 3 
3. THE PROGRESSES INCREASING THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL 7 
3.1. The Role of the Market for Corporate Control 8 
3.2. The Failure of Corporate Internal Control Systems 11 
3.3. Some Evidences From Banking: Barings and Daiwa Bank 14 
4. THE DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
24 
4.1. The Internal Control Model COSO 25 
4.1.1. What is Internal Control? 26 
4.1.2. What Internal Control Can Do? 32 
4.1.3. What Internal Control Cannot Do? 32 
4.1.4. Roles and Responsibilities 33 
4.2. Basel Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control Systems 34 
4.2.1. The Objectives and Role of the Internal Control 45 
4.2.2. The Major Elements of an Internal Control Process 46 
5. INTERNAL CONTROL IN TURKISH BANKING 59 
5.1. Structural Legislations in Turkish Banking 59 
5.2. Constitutional Regulations About Internal Control 62 
6. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 69 
6.1. Collection and Evaluation of Data 69 
6.2. The Tests and the Analysis Methods Used in the Study 70 
6.3. Findings 71 
6.4. The Effect of Internal Control System on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
operations 71 
6.4.1 The Effect of Basel Principles 71 
6.4.2. The Effect of the Components of Internal Control 72 
6.5. The Effect of Internal Control System on the Reliability of Financial Reportin 
73 
6.5.1 The Effect of Basel Principles 73 
V 
6.5.2. The Effect of the Components of Internal Control 74 
6.6. The Effect of Internal Control System on the Compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations 74 
6.6.1. The Effect of Basel Principles 74 
6.6.2. The Effect of the Components of Internal Control 75 




L I S T OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Leeson's Accounting Schemes 17 
Figure 2:Daiwa's Accounting Scheme 22 
Figure 3:Monitoring Applied to the Internal Control Process 29 
Figure 4:COSO Cube 31 
VII 
L I S T OF T A B L E S 
Table 1: To be subj ect to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all areas 71 
Table 2: Classification of the mean of the first objective 72 
Table 3: Coefficients of correlation between the first dependent variable and each of the 
control component 72 
Table 4: Classification of the mean of the second objective 73 
Table 5: Coefficients of correlation between the second dependent variable and each of the 
control component 74 
Table 6: Classification of the mean of the third objective 75 
Table 7: Coefficients of correlation between the third dependent variable and each of the 
control component 76 
VIII 
ABBREVIATIONS 
COSO : The Commitee of Sponsoring Organisations 
BRSA : Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
CMB : Capital Markets Board 
G M : General Motors 
C E O : Chief Executive Officer 
IBM : International Business Machines 
RISC : Reduced Instruction Set Computing 
G E : General Electric 
GD : General Dynamics 
SIMEX : Singapore International Monetary Exchange 
ING : International Netherlands Group 
U K : United Kingdom 
VAR : Value-at-risk 
US : United States 
MOF : Ministry of Finance 
FRBNY : Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
F D I C : Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
CPA : Certified Public Accountant 
SE C : Securities and Exchange Commission 
AAA : American Accounting Association 
AICPA : American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
F E I : Financial Executives International 
IIA : The Institute of Internal Auditors 
IMA : Institute of Management Accountants 
ICBS : International Conference of Banking Supervisors 
IX 
IOSCO : International Organization of Securities Commissions 
SIG : Standard Implementation Group 
IAIS : International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
BIS : Bank for International Settlements 
BRSB : Banking Regulation and Supervision Board 
E U : European Union 
SPSS : Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
X 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The need for a prudential supervision in order to maintain stability and 
confidence in the banking system is the main result of the recent years' 
globalization process. Strong internal control, including an internal audit 
function and an independent external audit are part of a sound corporate 
governance, which in turn can contribute to an efficient and collaborative 
working relationship between bank management and bank supervisors. 
(Palfi and Muresan (2009)) 
This increasing interest shown in the internal control and its continuous 
character is the consequence of an analysis, which was made upon the 
causes that lead to significant losses for many banks. The Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision was the one who has studied recent banking 
problems in order to identify the major sources of internal control 
deficiencies. Its analysis identified that an inadequate internal control 
system was the major cause of those losses. As a result, it reinforces the 
importance of having an highly qualified and experienced management, 
the most suitable internal and external auditors and, moreover, that bank 
supervisors focus more attention on strengthening internal control systems 
and continually evaluating their effectiveness. 
In this study, the necessity of an effective and efficient internal control 
system for ensuring the safe and soundness of a credit institution's 
activity will be underlined and the evolution of internal control systems 
and its reflections to Turkish Banking Industry wil l be examined. 
As regards the research methodology, it is based on a survey analysis on 
the effectiveness of internal control systems in Turkish banks. In order to 
reach to a conclusion, a questionnaire was created based on the model 
COSO which is used to evaluate the efectiveness of banks. Thus, starting 
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form a study made by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, we 
tried to identify what are the fundamental elements of an internal control 
should be to maintain an effective approach in Turkish Banking. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A system of an effective internal control is a critical component of an 
organisation's management and a foundation for its safe and sound 
operations. A system of strong internal controls can help to ensure that the 
goals and objectives of an organisation will be met, that it will achieve 
long-term targets and maintain reliable financial and managerial reporting. 
Such a system can also help to ensure that the organisation will comply 
with laws and regulations as well as policies, plans, internal rules and 
procedures, and reduce the risk of unexpected losses and damage to the 
organisation's reputation. The following presentations of internal control, 
in essence, cover the same ground. 
In USA, the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) issued Internal Control-Integrated Framework in 
1992, which defined internal control as a process, ensured by an entity's 
board of directors, management and other personnel. According to COSO, 
such a system was designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
i) effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
ii) reliability of financial reporting and 
iii) compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
The Rutteman Report (1994) in United Kingdom defined internal control 
in the paper Internal Control and Financial Reporting: Guidance for 
Directors of Listed Companies registered in the UK as the whole system of 
controls, financial and otherwise, established in order to provide 
reasonable assurance of effective and efficient operations, internal 
financial control and compliance with laws and regulations. 
In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CoCo, 1995) 
issued the Guidance of Control along the same lines as COSO. In CoCo's 
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Guidance of Control, control is put into context with how a task is 
performed. It says, "A person performs a task, guided by an understanding 
of its purpose (the objective to be achieved) and supported by capability 
(information, resources, supplies and skills). The person will need a sense 
of commitment to perform the task well over time. The person will 
monitor his or her performance and the external environment to learn 
about how to do the task better and about changes to be made. The same is 
true of any team or work group. In any organization of people the essence 
of control is purpose, commitment, capability, and monitoring and 
learning". 
The above criteria create the basis for understanding control in an 
organisation and for making judgements about the effectiveness of it, a 
characteristic, which was from the very old time the subject of many 
studies (Gibbs and Keating (1995); Tongren (1995); Turnbull Report 
(1999)). 
In Turkey, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), in order 
to observe the risks confronted by banks and to control them and with the 
aim of defining the bases and procedures related with risk management 
systems and internal audit systems to be founded by the banks prepared " 
Regulations about Internal Control and Risk Management of Banks " and 
it went into effect being published in the Official Gazette numbered 24312 
and dated 08.02.2001. With this regulation, the executive committee is to 
assign one of its members to fulfill the function of internal control (Elitas. 
and Özdemir (2006)). With "the notification pertaining to the system to be 
used in intermediary institutions" published on July 14 , 2003 by Capital 
Markets Board (CMB), bases and procedures pertaining to internal audit 
systems were regulated which are to be founded in order for the 
observation of risks confronted by the intermediary institiutions and 
controlling them. Furthermore, on November 1, 2006 "The Regulations on 
the Internal Systems of Banks" are published by BRSA, with the purpose 
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is to lay down procedures and principles concerning the internal control, 
internal audit and risk management systems to be established by banks and 
the functioning of these systems. 
Increasing density of company actions, deteriorating economic conditions, 
increasing competition have led companies to more efficient management 
and working methods. Internal control with the function of independent 
evaluation of activities such as financial formation, production, marketing 
and management is more advantageous for the companies (Ak (2004)). 
Internal control can be defined as a process, effected by an entity's board 
of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives. According 
to Yılancı (2003); "Internal control aims to lead the company activities in 
a way to increase the effifciency and power of competition; to manage the 
company's wealth reasonably; to provide investment and management 
consultancy to enable the prevention of faults and frauds. According to 
Moeller and Witt (1999) internal control system's essential role is helping 
an entity achieve its performance and profitability targets, and prevent loss 
of resources on the ground of efficiency and effectiveness. 
As regards bank's internal control, according to Turkish literature (Kepekçi 
(1982); Uzay (2003); Eşkazan (2003a, 2003b); Yurtsever (2003); Erdoğan 
(2005); Kayım (2006)), it consists of an ensemble of measures at 
management's disposal intended to ensure bank's proper functioning, a 
correct management of bank's assets and liabilities, and a true recording in 
accounting evidences. This definition expresses the striking feature of 
internal control and the participants to this process, but it is not complete. 
It does not include the part related to the content of this activity, which is 
detailed throughout its objectives. So, the internal control system's 
essential role is to pursue the following goals (Yurtsever (2008)): 
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• to respect all managerial policies and legal regulations, and to 
accomplish with regularity, in an economical, efficient and effective 
way, all the targets set out to do; 
• to use efficiently and optimum the resources, and to protect the assets 
by preventing and detecting the deviations, errors and frauds; 
• to keep correct and complete accounting records, so that it allow the 
information to be presented in the financial situations, according to the 
accounting standard adopted, and to ensure those information the 
following qualitative characteristics (Aldridge and Colbert (2003)) 
• controllability; considered to be good is not always enough for an 
information; the internal control has to give the possibility to check its 
exactitude; 
• relevancy; the information always need to be gear to the pursued aim; 
• availability; it is not enough to take possession of the information 
because, sometimes it might be too late; that is why internal control 
has to avoid such situation and to ensure the procurement of an 
information in a suitable time. 
In order to achieve its goals, internal control system should be organised 
according to a range of old qualitative principles (Rezaee (1995)), such as 
organisation, self-control, continuity, universality, independence, 
informing, harmony, personnel' quality. (Messier, Glover, and Prawitt 
(2006)) 
Sequentially, we are going to try to present the regulatory framework of 
the internal control system defined by the Basle Committee in Banking 
Supervision comparative with the Turkish one, trying as well to highlight 
the necessity of its efficiency and effectiveness. 
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3. THE PROGRESSES INCREASING THE 
IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
One meaning of globalization refers to "paper entrepreneurialism" and to 
the explosive growth of international financial markets: "Dwarfing the 
growth of trade in manufactured goods, these financial markets draw on 
the $20 trillion of swaps, options, and other derivatives that circulate 
around the world." In these markets, investors speculate on minute 
spreads in global interest rates, as well as in foreign currency exchanges 
that currently trade $2.5 trillion a day. According to Blau (1999), 
technological innovations in banking have helped to fuel this growth in 
speculative capacity. For example, when Chemical Bank purchased Chase 
Manhattan, it also acquired the $130 million centre in Bournemouth, 
England that Chase had built to process transactions from around the 
world. A satellite network connected this 323,000-square foot facility to 
offices in New York, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, and Tokyo; the 
telecommunications lines to London could transmit the equivalent of the 
city's telephone directory in 90 seconds. The total value of all transactions 
it handled reached trillions of dollars a year and the money naturally 
tended to go where more of it could be made in the fastest manner 
possible. "In essence, the financial markets are now so interlocked it is 
estimated that political and economic changes elsewhere account for 80 
percent of the turbulence in a given market. As a result, a rise of interest 
rates in New York can easily spark a sell-off in Mexico." 
This relentless quest for the highest rate of profit frequently deprives some 
countries of funds. For example, in the last decade of the 20th century; 
Sweden, Canada, Italy and Spain were deeply in debt and faced a capital 
shortage; however, U.S. investors were particularly uninterested in these 
investment opportunities. Rather than seek out these investment venues, 
from 1990 to the end of 1993, American investors absorbed a net total of 
$127 billion in the then-robust Asian and Latin American markets. In 
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1993, the Philippine market increased 133 percent; at the same time, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Brazil roughly doubled. Poland 
experienced the sharpest increase (718 percent), but Turkey managed to 
gain 214 percent, and Zimbabwe also increased 123 percent. According to 
Blau, "Countries that were deeply in debt simply could not compete with 
speculative opportunities like these." 
As the ability to speculate increased in the last years of the 20th century, 
though, so did the associated risks. Blau (1999) points out that some of the 
major financial downturns have affected the once-great, including Hedge 
fund manager George Soros, who lost $600 million by betting against a 
strong Japanese yen; Procter & Gamble, which lost $102 million on 
leveraged derivatives purchased from Bankers Trust Co.; and Nick 
Leeson, an unsupervised 28-year-old stock trader who wagered a total of 
$27 billion, primarily on differences in futures contracts between 
Singapore and Osaka. "Leeson lost $1.4 billion and bankrupted his 
employer, Barings P.L.C., a British investment firm that was 233 years 
old." 
3.1. The Role of the Market for Corporate Control 
According to Jensen (1993) there are only four control forces operating on 
the corporation to resolve the problems caused by a divergence between 
managers' decisions and those that are optimal from society's standpoint. 
They are the 
i) capital markets, 
ii) legal/political/regulatory system, 
iii) product and factor markets, and 
iv) internal control system headed by the board of directors. 
As explained elsewhere (Jensen (1989a, 1989b, 1991), Roe (1990, 1991)), 
the capital markets were relatively constrained by law and regulatory 
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practice from about 1940 until their resurrection through hostile tender 
offers in the 1970s. Prior to the 1970s capital market discipline took place 
primarily through the proxy process. (Pound (1993) analyzes the history of 
the political model of corporate control.) 
While the product and factor markets are slow to act as a control force, 
their discipline is inevitable-firms that do not supply the product that 
customers desire at a competitive price cannot survive. Unfortunately, 
when product and factor market disciplines take effect it can often be too 
late to save much of the enterprise. To avoid this waste of resources, it is 
important for us to learn how to make the other three organizational 
control forces more expedient and efficient. (Jensen (1993)) 
Substantial data support the proposition that the internal control systems of 
publicly held corporations have generally failed to cause managers to 
maximize efficiency and value. More persuasive than the formal statistical 
evidence is the fact that few firms ever restructure themselves or engage in 
a major strategic redirection without a crisis either in the capital markets, 
the legal/political/regulatory system, or the product/factor markets. But 
there are firms that have proved to be flexible in their responses to 
changing market conditions in an evolutionary way. For example, 
investment banking firms and consulting firms seem to be better at 
responding to changing market conditions. (Jensen (1993)) 
The capital markets provided one mechanism for accomplishing change 
before losses in the product markets generate a crisis. While the corporate 
control activity of the 1980s has been widely criticized as 
counterproductive to American industry, few have recognized that many of 
these transactions were necessary to accomplish exit over the objections of 
current managers and other constituencies of the firm such as employees 
and communities. For example, the solution to excess capacity in the tire 
industry came about through the market for corporate control. Every major 
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U.S. tire firm was either taken over or restructured in the 1980s. In total, 
37 tire plants were shut down in the period 1977 to 1987 and total 
employment in the industry fell by over 40 percent. (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (1987)) 
Capital market and corporate control transactions such as the repurchase of 
stock (or the purchase of another company) for cash or debt creates exit of 
resources in a very direct way. When Chevron acquired Gulf for $13.2 
billion in cash and debt in 1984, the net assets devoted to the oil industry 
fell by $13.2 billion as soon as the checks were mailed out. In the 1980s 
the oil industry had to shrink to accommodate the reduction in the quantity 
of oil demanded and the reduced rate of growth of demand. This meant 
paying out to shareholders its huge cash inflows, reducing exploration and 
development expenditures to bring reserves in line with reduced demands, 
and closing refining and distribution facilities. The leveraged acquisitions 
and equity repurchases helped accomplish this end for virtually all major 
U.S. oil firms ( Jensen (1986b, 1988)). 
The era of the control market came to an end, however, in late 1989 and 
1990. Intense controversy and opposition from corporate managers, 
assisted by charges of fraud, the increase in default and bankruptcy rates, 
and insider trading prosecutions, caused the shutdown of the control 
market through court decisions, state antitakeover amendments, and 
regulatory restrictions on the availability of financing. (Swartz (1992), and 
Comment and Schwert (1993)). 
In 1991, the total value of transactions fell to $96 billion from $340 
billion in 1988. LBOs and management buyouts fell to slightly over $1 
billion in 1991 from $80 billion in 1988. The demise of the control market 
as an effective influence on American corporations has not ended the 
restructuring, but it has meant that organizations have typically postponed 
addressing the problems they face until forced to by financial difficulties 
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generated by the product markets. Unfortunately the delay means that 
some of these organizations will not survive-or will survive as mere 
shadows of their former selves. (Jensen (1993)) 
3.2. The Failure of Corporate Internal Control Systems 
According to Jensen, with the shutdown of the capital markets as an 
effective mechanism for motivating change, renewal, and exit, we are left 
to depend on the internal control system to act to preserve organizational 
assets, both human and nonhuman. Throughout corporate America, the 
problems that motivated much of the control activity of the 1980s are now 
reflected in lacklustre performance, financial distress, and pressures for 
restructuring. Kodak, IBM, Xerox, ITT, and many others have faced or are 
now facing severe challenges in the product markets. We therefore must 
understand why these internal control systems have failed and learn how to 
make them work. (Jensen (1993)) 
By nature, organizations abhor control systems, and ineffective 
governance is a major part of the problem with internal control 
mechanisms. They seldom respond in the absence of a crisis. The recent 
GM board revolt which resulted in the firing of CEO Robert Stempel 
exemplifies the failure, not the success, of GM's governance system. 
General Motors, one of the world's high-cost producers in a market with 
substantial excess capacity, avoided making major changes in its strategy 
for over a decade. The revolt came too late: the board acted to remove the 
CEO only in 1992, after the company had reported losses of $6.5 billion in 
1990 and 1991 and an opportunity loss of over $100 billion in its R&D and 
capital expenditure program over the eleven-year period 1980 to 1990. 
(Jensen (1993)) 
11 
Unfortunately, GM is not an isolated example. IBM is another testimony 
to the failure of internal control systems: it failed to adjust to the 
substitution away from its mainframe business following the revolution in 
the Workstation and personal computer market-ironically enough a 
revolution that it helped launch with the invention of the RISC technology 
in 1974 (Loomis (1993)). Like GM, IBM is a high-cost producer in a 
market with substantial excess capacity. It too began to change its strategy 
significantly and removed its CEO only after reporting losses of $2.8 
billion in 1991 and further losses in 1992 while losing almost 65 percent of 
its equity value. (Jensen (1993)) 
Eastman Kodak, another major U.S. company formerly dominant in its 
market, also failed to adjust to competition and has performed poorly. Its 
$37 share price in 1992 was roughly unchanged from 1981. After several 
reorganizations, it only recently began to seriously change its incentives 
and strategy, and it appointed a chief financial officer well-known for 
turning around troubled companies. (Unfortunately he resigned only 
several months later-after, according to press reports, running into 
resistance from the current management and board about the necessity for 
dramatic change.) (Jensen (1993)) 
General Electric (GE) under Jack Welch, who has been CEO since 1981, is 
a counterexample to our proposition about the failure of corporate internal 
control systems. GE has accomplished a major strategic redirection, 
eliminating 104,000 of its 402,000 person workforce (through layoffs or 
sales of divisions) in the period 1980 to 1990 without the motivation of a 
threat from capital or product markets. But there is little evidence to 
indicate this is due to anything more than the vision and persuasive powers 
of Jack Welch rather than the influence of GE's governance system. 
(Jensen (1993)) 
General Dynamics (GD) provides another counterexample. The 
appointment of William Anders as CEO in September 1991 (coupled with 
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large changes in its management compensation system which tied bonuses 
to increases in stock value) resulted in its rapid adjustment to excess 
capacity in the defense industry-again with no apparent threat from any 
outside force. (Jensen (1993)) 
GD generated $3.4 billion of increased value on a $1 billion company in 
just over two years (Murphy and Dial (1992)). Sealed Air (Wruck (1992)) 
is another particularly interesting example of a company that restructured 
itself without the threat of an immediate crisis. CEO Dermot Dumphy 
recognized the necessity for redirection, and after several attempts to 
rejuvenate the company to avoid future competitive problems in the 
product markets, created a crisis by voluntarily using the capital markets in 
a leveraged restructuring. Its value more than tripled over a three-year 
period. 
These companies are hold up as examples of successes of the internal 
control systems, because each redirection was initiated without immediate 
crises in the product or factor markets, the capital markets, or in the 
legal/political/regulatory system. The problem is that they are far too rare. 
Although the strategic redirection of General Mills provides another 
counterexample (Donaldson (1990)), the fact that it took more than ten 
years to accomplish the change leaves serious questions about the social 
costs of continuing the waste caused by ineffective control. It appears that 
internal control systems have two faults. They react too late, and they take 
too long to effect major change. Changes motivated by the capital market 
are generally accomplished quickly-within one and a half to three years. 
As yet no one has demonstrated the social benefit from relying on purely 
internally motivated change that offsets the costs of the decade-long delay 
exhibited by General Mills. (Jensen (1993)) 
In summary, it appears that the infrequency with which large corporate 
organizations restructure or redirect themselves solely on the basis of the 
internal control mechanisms in the absence of crises in the product, factor, 
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or capital markets or the regulatory sector is strong testimony to the 
inadequacy of these control mechanisms. 
3.3. Some Evidences From Banking: Barings and Daiwa Bank 
Founded in 1762, Barings Bank (previously known as Baring Brothers & 
Co.) was the oldest merchant banking company in England. Barings 
collapsed on February 26, 1995 as the result of the activities of one of its 
traders, Nick Leeson, who lost $1.4 billion by investing in the Singapore 
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) with primarily derivative 
securities. This was actually the second time the bank had been faced with 
bankruptcy. Following the collapse, Barings was purchased by the Dutch 
bank/insurance company ING (for the nominal sum of one pound) and 
today no longer exists as a corporate entity; however, the Baring family's 
name lives on in Baring Asset Management. An autobiography of Leeson 
and the events leading up to the collapse of Barings were dramatized in the 
movie "Rogue Trader." According to Wolfgang H. Reinicke (1998), in 
view of recent developments in the derivatives markets, the Basle 
Committee recognized that its existing formula focused too much on credit 
risk and too little on market and operational risks. As a result, a series of 
intense discussions took place within the committee, as well as between 
regulators and the private sector over the next few years. 
This initiative resulted in what represented a dramatic shift in the global 
public policy framework developed in the late 1980s. In an effort to 
accommodate the changes that had taken place in the markets, the Basle 
Committee issued for comment a proposal on a capital standard based on 
market risk in April 1993; however, the private sector responded with 
sharp criticisms that the proposed reforms were too complex for smaller 
institutions to manage, and too difficult for the public to understand, and 
still too primitive for banks that had already been active in the derivatives 
market by using much more sophisticated risk management techniques. 
14 
In the controversy that ensued, the future of global regulatory 
arrangements was determined by regulators who soon came to realize that 
there was only one way they could hope to control what, by 1994, had 
become a rapidly evolving and ever more complex industry: "They would 
have to not only engage the private sector to a much larger degree in the 
agenda setting and formulation of global public policy, but also make 
extensive use of public-private partnerships during implementation." This 
served as the catalyst for embracing a new approach, a process that 
significantly accelerated following the collapse of the Barings Group, a 
major U.K. bank, in February 1995. 
According to Reinicke (1998), the collapse occurred with almost no 
warning and happened quickly. The collapse itself involved the extensive 
proprietary use of derivatives to establish large, highly leveraged positions 
in Nikkei 225 (Japanese equities) futures on the futures exchanges in 
Singapore and Osaka. Reincke writes, "Barings' collapse came on the heels 
of other financial crises involving derivatives, such as those of the 
government of Orange County, California, and the German firm 
Metallgesellschaft." 
The collapse of the Barings Bank identified three fundamental 
shortcomings that had to be addressed in order to establish a revised 
framework for global public policy: 
1. As late as the end of 1993 Barings had a capital ratio well in excess of 
the Basle Agreement's 8 percent requirement, and in January 1995 it was 
still considered a safe bank; the fact that Barings found itself in 
receivership only two months later could not but raise serious doubts about 
the adequacy of the regulatory system for capital requirements; 
2. The collapse showed that internal controls at Barings were totally 
inadequate to support the activities of its traders; and 
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3. It was evidence that regulators in different countries had failed to 
communicate with each other to a degree sufficient to reduce at least in 
part the information asymmetry that globalization had created. 
Against the background of these events and the shortcomings they 
revealed, the Basle Committee accelerated its efforts and in April 1995 
issued for comment a proposal for an entirely new approach toward the 
regulation and calculation of banks' capital requirements. For the first time 
in their history, banks would be allowed to use their own internal risk 
management models, which they use for their routine day-to-day trading 
and risk management, to determine their capital requirements. 
Regulators would no longer impose or enforce strict, uniform, quantitative 
limits on the activities of banks. Rather, in recognition of the growing 
complexity and innovative dynamism of the global financial services 
industry, the Basle Committee acknowledged that, provided certain 
qualitative and quantitative safeguards were present, the banks' own 
control and risk management mechanisms would prove superior to any that 
regulators could impose. The committee proposed to allow banks to use 
their own in-house risk models, also called value-at-risk (VAR) models, 
which are designed to assess and monitor market risk (the form of risk 
perceived to be the greatest threat arising from the emergence of the 
derivatives markets) and, on the basis of these models, to calculate their 
own capital charges. At the same time, however, banks would be required 
to use a common approach to measure risk, the so-called "value-at-risk" 
approach. Reincke notes that value-at-risk is an estimate, to a certain level 
of confidence, of the maximum possible loss in value of a portfolio or 
financial position over a given period of time; the Group of Thirty had 
recommended such an approach in the past. 
The Barings collapse confirmed that internal controls at Barings were 
clearly insufficient to detect what was taking place with Leeson's 
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derivatives trades. While initial accounts cantered on the fraudulent 
activities of Leeson, and evidence suggests that Leeson was in fact 
engaged in highly speculative transactions and deliberately tried to deceive 
his superiors, his actions were not the only reason for the group's failure. 
To offset mistaken trades, which were aimed at arbitraging minute-to-
minute differences in Nikkei futures prices between the Singapore and 
Japanese exchanges, Leeson recorded large unmatched trades in an Error 
Account, superstitiously numbered 88888. This settlement account had 
been placed under his control in July 1992 by the firm's London Office for 
the purpose of netting minor trading mistakes inside Singapore books. The 
net position was to be closed each day and the net value of gains and losses 
incurred in negating the position were to be recorded as part of the 
Singapore unit's daily profit. (See Figure 1) This 88888 account - and the 
authority to use it - remained in Singapore even after the reporting system 
was revised to book all errors straight through to London. Totally 
inadequate internal communications, controls, and channels of 
accountability, as well as insufficient regulatory oversight, compounded 
these findings by UK regulators as did a lack of communication between 
regulators in the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore. 
Figure 1: Leeson's Accounting Schemes 
Trading Losses Posted to Account 88888 -
x 
Margin Calls on Trading Position at a percent -
ax 
Funding From: +(1 + a)x 
Leeson's Commission Income (Feb. to Dec 1992) 
Premiums From Selling in-the-money Options (Dec. 1992 - Oct. 1994) 
Transfers requested from London (From 1993 on) 
Incremental Net Accounting Income Posted in Singapore 0 
Source: Kane, Edward J. and Kimberly DeTrask (1998) 
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The most glaring aspect of the lack of internal communication is that it 
was common knowledge on the futures markets that Barings was building 
an increasingly risky position. As one U.S. fund manager put it, "The 
futures community [had] known of this mega-position for about the last 
three months." In New York the manager of one of the biggest hedge funds 
said that "news of Barings' purchase of contracts had been the subject of 
'intense discussion' in the financial markets for at least two weeks," and 
short of completely inadequate in-house communications, it is 
inconceivable that senior management was unaware of these 
developments. 
The failure of Barings' management to prevent the collapse of Barings also 
resulted from Barings' flawed internal controls and channels of 
accountability. "Leeson was responsible for both the trading and the 
settlement sides of the Singapore operations, which made it easier for him 
to conceal his contracts from his superiors." Nevertheless, senior 
management officials at Barings had been made aware of this situation as 
early as 1992. At that time the head of Barings' Securities operations in 
Singapore alerted the firm's management in London to the potential 
dangers of having Leeson manage both trading and settlement. In March 
1992 he wrote to the head of equities in London, "My concern is that we 
are in danger of setting up a structure which will subsequently prove 
disastrous and with which we will succeed in losing either a lot of money 
or client goodwill or probably both." According to Nikki Tait, the fact that 
Leeson had no gross position limits on proprietary trading operations made 
the potentially dangerous management structure even worse. 
From the evidence available to date, it appears that such concerns were not 
communicated to Barings' external auditors, who almost certainly would 
have included them in the annual report on management systems and 
controls, based on UK banking regulations that were submitted to the Bank 
of England. Senior executives at Barings conceded that they did not really 
understand the esoteric business of derivatives, so their guidance for Nick 
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Leeson was not strategic in nature but was rather quantitative: "Rather than 
set long-term vision, with controls and attention to relationships, they 
simply asked Leeson to deliver more of the profits to which they had 
become accustomed. Was Leeson wrong? Yes. But so was the strategy, or 
the lack of it." 
Barings has not been the only such financial institution so effected by 
insufficient internal controls, although every situation is unique. For example, 
in spite of the notoriety and infamy of the Leeson case, over a year later 
Sumitomo Bank faced an estimated $1.8 billion loss also attributable to a 
single rogue trader. 
In the wake of Leeson and the Barings Bank episode, the growth of global 
financial transactions, insider trading, executive remuneration, and misuse of 
pension funds, has been added to the list of corporate shenanigans that have 
fuelled changes in the regulatory environment. For example, Broadhurst and 
Ledgerwood report that in 1993, the Caux Round Table, based in Switzerland, 
adopted an international code for multinational firms in Europe, North 
America and Japan; this international code identifies five basic principles that 
go well beyond the earlier codes that focused on more restricted abuses. 
Those principles are: 
1) Stakeholder responsibility; 
2) Social justice; 
3) Mutual support; 
4) Environmental concern; and, 
5) Avoidance of illicit operations and corrupt practices. 
Subsequent to the collapse of Barings, SIMEX also reviewed its regulatory 
rules, auditing, surveillance, and clearing practices, as well as exchange-wide 
systems to strengthen safeguards against settlement risks. According to Lall 
and Liu, SIMEX appointed an international advisory panel comprised of 
distinguished professionals and regulators from the international futures 
industry to seek advice on the best practices in global futures exchanges and 
to identify areas for cooperation with other futures exchanges. As Leeson had 
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been based in Singapore, officials there attempted to improve supervisory 
coordination for futures trading in an increasingly global environment. As a 
result, SIMEX appointed Dr. Roger Rutz as its consultant on risk 
management. 
The international advisory panel recommended: 
(1) The enhancement of customer protection rules; 
(2) An upgrading of the clearing system and procedures to incorporate real¬
time settlement and critical risk management systems; 
(3) The promotion of information sharing among exchanges; 
(4) The imposition of a requirement that clearing firms register senior officers 
with SIMEX; 
(5) The strengthening of SIMEX's Market Surveillance Department; and, 
(6) Enhancements to the large trade reporting system. 
Dr. Rutz's recommendations addressed all areas of SIMEX's operations, with 
an emphasis on risk management, capital requirements, and the clearing 
system; his major suggestions included: 
• Devising comprehensive internal risk analysis procedures to identify high 
risk accounts and members in need of closer monitoring. These procedures 
would include stress testing of positions, analysis of daily settlements and 
margin calls, as well as analysis of position and market concentration. 
• Enhancing SIMEX's monitoring ability, including notification by member 
firms when a margin call is issued for any account in excess of their adjusted 
net capital, reporting large positions, aggregation of accounts, and 
reconciliation of reported positions. 
• Increasing SIMEX's power to control or direct the operations of member 
firms in highly vulnerable positions. 
• Regulating higher position limits through explicit hedging, arbitrage, risk 
management, and other qualitative and financial exposure criteria. 
• Establishing procedures to manage high risk situations including improved 
information-gathering to help evaluate challenging situations, and improved 
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default procedures to transfer to other clearing members, in bulk, those 
positions carried by defaulting brokers who threaten the system's integrity. 
This evidence showed that the now-infamous Singapore-based derivatives 
trader, Nicholas Leeson, drove Britain's venerable Barings Bank to 
bankruptcy. Although the evidence to date suggests that Leeson was in fact 
involved in shady deals, it appears that other factors were also involved in the 
bank's collapse. Leeson's superior knew, or should have known, what the 
trader was up to, and had been provided with advance notice concerning his 
activities. Furthermore, Leeson was not the only trader engaged in such 
activities, and the philosophy of many financial institutions of the day 
appeared to encourage the sorts of techniques employed by Leeson. In the 
final analysis, the Leeson case demonstrates what can happen when one 
individual is entrusted with too much power, and only time will tell i f the 
remedial steps taken since then will preclude such recurrences in the future. 
At Daiwa, as in Barings, a trader who operated out of a subsidiary office far 
from firm headquarters ran up unacknowledged losses. Also as at Barings, 
higher-management checks and balances on the settlement of trading 
activities were distressingly incomplete. Most of Daiwa's $1.1 billion in 
trading losses were funded by the simple expedient of not booking out of 
custody the transfer of the particular securities that were sold at a loss, as 
depicted in Figure 2. Leeson controlled the posting of net settlements; 
conspiring with colleagues, Toshihide Iguchi controlled postings to the 
custody account. Iguchi's unprofitable trades moved the securities 
physically out of Daiwa's vaults, but their departure was simply not 
booked. From an accounting point of view, this simple fraud served to 
transform losing trades into accounting 'nonevents.' Each unbooked trade 
became the accounting equivalent of a tree falling in a foreign forest far 
beyond earshot of the firm's Osaka headquarters. 
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Figure 2:Daiwa's Accounting Scheme 
Trading Revenue on Selected Securities (Posted as Other Revenue) +x 
Custody Account for the Same Securities (Not Debited) 
Surplus Available for Funding Other Losses +x 
Source: Kane, Edward J. and Kimberly DeTrask (1998) 
Three other significant differences emerge. First, the duration of the fraud at 
Daiwa was four times longer than that at Barings. Second, Daiwa's regulators 
and top management in the home country admitted their involvement in the 
cover-up. Third, while the losses at each institution were of similar 
magnitude, Leeson's activities caused Baring's collapse; Iguchi's fraud led to 
Daiwa's expulsion from operating in the United States, but did not induce the 
bank's demise. 
According to their official testimony, Baring's management had the 
misfortune of discovering Leeson's losses after he had abandoned his office 
and fled the country, at which time it was too late to save the bank. The Iguchi 
dealings came to light under less climactic circumstances. After twelve years 
of unauthorized trading of U.S. Treasury obligations that cumulated to $1.1 
billion in losses, Toshihide Iguchi, Executive Vice President of The Daiwa 
Bank, Ltd, articulated his activities in a July 17, 1995 thirty-page confession 
letter to Daiwa President Akira Fujita. On August 8, Fujita informally notified 
Yoshimasa Nishimura, Banking Bureau Chief of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) about the losses. Daiwa did not inform U.S. regulators of the 
scandal until September 18, when it formally reported the losses to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). Japanese regulators also 
received formal notice on that date. 
Once informed of the scandal, U.S. authorities acted quickly - Iguchi was 
arrested on September 23 and Cease and Desist Orders were issued jointly by 
the New York State Banking Department, FRBNY, the Board of Governors, 
and the FDIC on October 2. These orders severely limited the activities of 
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both the bank and Daiwa Trust Co., and called for an independent CPA firm 
to conduct a forensic review of the $1.1 billion in securities trading losses, to 
prepare a complete reconciliation and verification of bank assets, and to 
perform a comprehensive audit of internal controls, custody business, risk-
management, and management information systems for both Daiwa and 
Daiwa Trust. 
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4. THE DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The importance of Sarbanes-Oxley Act should not be understated. It is the 
most extensive amendment of securities law since the 1930's, and was the 
result of a wave of corporate and accounting scandals, including, but not 
limited to Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Xerox, Sunbeam, Adelphia and Arthur 
Anderson. The guilty ones have generally been senior management who 
have manipulated accounting information to enrich themselves through the 
provisions of their stock options. 
The Enron Corporation debacle was a disaster for its executives, 
employees, accountants, investment bankers, and investors. Everyone from 
employees to underwriters and even corporate executives suffered as a 
result of Enron's fallout. The disaster did not stop with Enron. Financial 
scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron 
ultimately cost shareholders $460 billion. Effects of Enron changed the 
way companies do business. In an effort to restore investor confidence, 
large corporations which in the past had worked to keep their audit costs 
low found it necessary to spend additional money on annual financial 
reviews and now pour more resources into annual audits than in pre-Enron 
years. Some corporations, such as General Electric, went beyond the new 
legal requirements, setting more stringent internal control standards in 
response to the Enron bankruptcy. 
The accounting profession also suffered from these financial scandals. At 
one time the accounting industry was dominated by the Big Five 
accounting firms, however, Enron's collapse led to the demise of Enron 
auditor Arthur Anderson. 
The accounting profession in the United States was once largely self-
regulating. As a result of Enron and other corporate scandals, new rules 
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and regulations in the United States passed by Congress and enacted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 
The first government response to Enron in the United States was an SEC 
order requiring chief executive officers ("CEOs") of the largest American 
companies to certify their financial statements. Then, in another effort to 
put an end to corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 ("the Act," or "Sarbanes-Oxley").The Act has been called "the 
most significant legislation governing US securities markets since the 
1930s." Remarkably, the Act became law a mere seven months after Enron 
filed for bankruptcy. The Act was introduced into Congress in early July 
2002 and was signed into law by President Bush by the end of that month. 
Receiving a vote of ninety-seven to zero in the United States Senate, the 
Act was designed to take precautions on all the Enron-WorldCom-Global 
Crossing chicanery and to provide tough criminal penalties for those who 
violate its provisions. While Sarbanes-Oxley was the leader in many new 
requirements, it was primarily designed to restore financial confidence in 
American securities markets. Chief executive officers and other corporate 
officials also found themselves on notice: executives could be subject to 
lengthy prison terms and substantial fines i f their financial records were 
judged as fraudulent. Sarbanes-Oxley's new guidelines apply not only to 
American companies, but also to foreign corporations whose securities 
trade in the United States. 
4.1. The Internal Control Model COSO 
Internal control means different things to different people. This causes 
confusion among businesspeople, legislators, regulators and others. 
Resulting miscommunication and different expectations cause problems 
within an enterprise. Problems are compounded when the term, i f not 
clearly defined, is written into law, regulation or rule. 
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4.1.1. What is Internal Control? 
Internal control is broadly defined as a process, effected by an 
entity's board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in 
the following categories: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
• Reliability of financial reporting. 
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
Internal control can be judged as effective in each of these categories.if: 
i) the board of directors and management have reasonable assurance 
that they understand the extent to which the entity's operations objectives 
are being achieved 
ii) published financial statements are being prepared reliably and 
iii) applicable laws and regulations are being complied with. 
The first category addresses an entity's basic business objectives, 
including performance and profitability goals and safeguarding of 
resources. The second relates to the preparation of reliable published 
financial statements, including interim and condensed financial statements 
and selected financial data derived from such statements, such as earnings 
releases, reported publicly. The third deals with complying with those laws 
and regulations to which the entity is subject. These distinct but 
overlapping categories address different needs and allow a directed focus 
to meet the separate needs. 
Internal control systems operate at different levels of effectiveness. 
Internal control can be judged effective in each of the three categories, 
respectively, i f the board of directors and management have reasonable 
assurance that: 
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• They understand the extent to which the entity's operations objectives 
are being achieved. 
• Published financial statements are being prepared reliably. 
• Applicable laws and regulations are being complied with. 
While internal control is a process, its effectiveness is a state or condition 
of the process at one or more points in time. 
Internal control consists of five interrelated components. These are derived 
from the way management runs a business, and are integrated with the 
management process. Although the components apply to all entities, small 
and mid-size companies may implement them differently than large ones. 
Its controls may be less formal and less structured, yet a small company 
can stil have effective internal control. The components are: 
• Control Environment 
The control environment sets the tone of an organization, influencing the 
control consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other 
components of internal control, providing discipline and structure. Control 
environment factors include the integrity, ethical values and competence 
of the entity's people; management's philosophy and operating style; the 
way management assigns authority and responsibility, and organizes and 
develops its people; and the attention and direction provided by the board 
of directors. 
• Risk Assessment 
Every entity faces a variety of risks from external and internal sources that 
must be assessed. A precondition to risk assessment is establishment of 
objectives, linked at different levels and internally consistent. Risk 
assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks to 
achievement of the objectives, forming a basis for determining how the 
risks should be managed. Because economic, industry, regulatory and 
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operating conditions will continue to change, mechanisms are needed to 
identify and deal with the special risks associated with change. 
• Control Activities 
Control activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure 
management directives are carried out. They help ensure that necessary 
actions are taken to address risks to achievement of the entity's objectives. 
Control activities ocur throughout the organization, at all levels and in all 
functions. They include a range of activities as diverse as approvals, 
authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, reviews of operating 
performance, security of assets and segregation of duties. 
• Information and Communication 
Pertinent information must be identified, captured and communicated in a 
form and timeframe that enable people to carry out their responsibilities. 
Information systems produce reports, containing operational, financial and 
compliance-related information, that make it possible to run and control 
the business. They deal not only with internally generated data, but also 
information about external events, activities and conditions necessary to 
informed business decision-making and external reporting. Effective 
communication also must occur in a broader sense, flowing down, across 
and up the organization. Al l personnel must receive a clear message from 
top management that control responsibilities must be taken seriously. They 
must understand their own role in the internal control system, as well as 
how individual activities relate to the work of others. They must have a 
means of communicating significant information upstream. There also 
needs to be effective communication with external parties, such as 
customers, suppliers, regulators and shareholders. 
• Monitoring 
Internal control systems need to be monitored-a process that assesses the 
quality of the system's performance over time. This is accomplished 
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through ongoing monitoring activities, separate evaluations or a 
combination of the two. Ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of 
operations. It includes regular management and supervisory activities, and 
other actions personnel take in performing their duties. The scope and 
frequency of separate evaluations will depend primarily on an assessment 
of risks and the effectiveness of ongoing monitoring procedures. Internal 
control deficiencies should be reported upstream, with serious matters 
reported to top management and the board." 
Figure 3:Monitoring Applied to the Internal Control Process 
These components combine to form an integrated system of controls. To 
conclude that internal control is effective in any category of objectives 
(operations, financial reporting, or compliance) all five components must 
be present and functioning. The Integrated Framework uses three 
dimensions, illustrated in the cube below, that provide management with 
criteria by which to evaluate internal controls. 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) is a voluntary 
private sector organization dedicated to improving the quality of financial 
reporting through business ethics, effective internal controls and corporate 
governance. COSO was originally formed in 1985 to sponsor the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, an independent private 
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sector initiative which studied the causal factors that can lead to fraudulent 
financial reporting and developed recommendations for public companies 
and their independent auditors, for the SEC and other regulators, and for 
educational institutions. The National Commission was jointly sponsored 
by five major professional associations in the United States, the American 
Accounting Association(AAA), the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants(AICPA), Financial Executives International(FEI), The 
Institute of Internal Auditors(IAA), and the National Association of 
Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants(IMA)). The 
Commission was wholly independent of each of the sponsoring 
organizations, and contained representatives from industry, public 
accounting, investment firms, and the New York Stock Exchange. The 
Chairman of the National Commission was James C. Treadway, Jr., 
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Paine Webber 
Incorporatedand a former Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Currently, the COSO Chairman is David L. 
Landsittel 
Before Sarbanes Oxley Act was enacted, COSO had been operating to 
ensure the effectiveness of the firms' internal audits to fight against the 
corporate scandals and several audit failures. After the act its approaches 
on internal control systems has been majorly used. 
The COSO Framework considers not only the evaluation of hard controls, 
like segregation of duties, but also soft controls, such as the competence 
and professionalism of employees. Especially in the United States, these 
concepts have been adopted by many organizations, as well as by many 
governmental entities. Applying COSO to practice is not so simple as 
adopting it in theory, however. No defined approach exists for auditing 
"soft" controls like the integrity and ethical values of staff, the philosophy 






Figure 4:COSO Cube 
The first dimension is objectives. Internal controls are designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that objectives are achieved in the following 
categories: effectiveness and efficiency of operations (including 
safeguarding of assets), reliability of financial reporting, and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations (left to right, across the top of 
thecube). 
The second dimension required by COSO is an entity-level focus and an 
activity-level focus (front to back, across the right side of the cube). 
Internal controls must be evaluated at two levels: at the entity level, and at 
the activity or process level. 
The third dimension includes the five components of internal controls 
(bottom to top, on the face of the cube) The framework works in the 
following manner: For any given objective, such as reliability of financial 
reporting, management must evaluate the five components of internal 
control at both the entity level and at the activity (or process) level. 
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4.1.2. What Internal Control Can Do? 
Internal control can help an entity achieve its performance and 
profitability targets, and prevent loss of resources. It can help ensure 
reliable financial reporting. And it can help ensure that the enterprise 
complies with laws and regulations, avoiding damage to its reputation and 
other consequences. In sum, it can help an entity get to where it wants to 
go, and avoid pitfalls and surprises along the way. 
4.1.3. What Internal Control Cannot Do? 
Unfortunately, some people have greater, and unrealistic, 
expectations. They look for absolutes, believing that: 
• Internal control can ensure an entity's success that is, it will ensure 
achievement of basic business objectives or wil l , at the least, ensure 
survival. 
Even effective internal control can only help an entity achieve these 
objectives. It can provide management information about the entity's 
progress, or lack of it, toward their achievement. But internal control 
cannot change an inherently poor manager into a good one. And, shifts in 
government policy or programs, competitors' actions or economic 
conditions can be beyond management's control. Internal control cannot 
ensure success, or even survival. 
• Internal control can ensure the reliability of financial reporting and 
compliance with laws and regulations. 
This belief is also unwarranted. An internal control system, no matter how 
well conceived and operated, can provide only reasonable—not absolute-¬
assurance to management and the board regarding achievement of an 
entity's objectives. The likelihood of achievement is affected by limitations 
inherent in all internal control systems. These include the realities that 
judgments in decision-making can be faulty, and that breakdowns can 
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occur because of simple error or mistake. Additionally, controls can be 
circumvented by the collusion of two or more people, and management has 
the ability to override the system. Another limiting factor is that the design 
of an internal control system must reflect the fact that there are resource 
constraints, and the benefits of controls must be considered relative to their 
costs. 
4.1.4. Roles and Responsibilities 
Management: The chief executive officer is ultimately responsible and 
should assume "ownership" of the system. More than any other individual, 
the chief executive sets the "tone at the top" that affects integrity and ethics 
and other factors of a positive control environment. In a large company, 
the chief executive fulfills this duty by providing leadership and direction 
to senior managers and reviewing the way they're controlling the business. 
Senior managers, in turn, assign responsibility for establishment of more 
specific internal control policies and procedures to personnel responsible 
for the unit's functions. In a smaller entity, the influence of the chief 
executive, often an owner-manager, is usually more direct. In any event, in 
a cascading responsibility, a manager is effectively a chief executive of his 
or her sphere of responsibility. Of particular significance are financial 
officers and their staffs, whose control activities cut across, as well as up 
and down, the operating and other units of an enterprise. 
Board of Directors: Management is accountable to the board of directors, 
which provides governance, guidance and oversight. Effective board 
members are objective, capable and inquisitive. They also have a 
knowledge of the entity's activities and environment, and commit the time 
necessary to fulfill their board responsibilities. Management may be in a 
position to override controls and ignore or stifle communications from 
subordinates, enabling a dishonest management which intentionally 
misrepresents results to cover its tracks. A strong, active board, 
particularly when coupled with effective upward communications channels 
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and capable financial, legal and internal audit functions, is often best able 
to identify and correct such a problem. 
Internal Auditors: Internal auditors play an important role in evaluating 
the effectiveness of control systems, and contribute to ongoing 
effectiveness. Because of organizational position and authority in an 
entity, an internal audit function often plays a significant monitoring role. 
Other Personnel: Internal control is, to some degree, the responsibility of 
everyone in an organization and therefore should be an explicit or implicit 
part of everyone's job description. Virtually all employees produce 
information used in the internal control system or take other actions 
needed to effect control. Also, all personnel should be responsible for 
communicating upward problems in operations, noncompliance with the 
code of conduct, or other policy violations or illegal actions. 
A number of external parties often contribute to achievement of an entity's 
objectives. External auditors, bringing an independent and objective view, 
contribute directly through the financial statement audit and indirectly by 
providing information useful to management and the board in carrying out 
their responsibilities. Others providing information to the entity useful in 
effecting internal control are legislators and regulators, customers and 
others transacting business with the enterprise, financial analysts, bond 
raters and the news media. External parties, however, are not responsible 
for, nor are they a part of, the entity's internal control system. 
4.2. Basel Principles for the Assessment of Internal Control 
Systems 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established as the 
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices by the 
central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries at the end of 1974 
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in the aftermath of serious disturbances in international currency and 
banking markets (notably the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in West 
Germany). The first meeting took place in February 1975 and meetings 
have been held regularly three or four times a year since. 
The Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Countries 
are represented by their central bank and also by the authority with formal 
responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking business where this 
is not the central bank. The present Chairman of the Committee is Mr Nout 
Wellink, President of the Netherlands Bank. 
The Committee encourages contacts and cooperation among its members 
and other banking supervisory authorities. It circulates to supervisors 
throughout the world both published and unpublished papers providing 
guidance on banking supervisory matters. Contacts have been further 
strengthened by an International Conference of Banking Supervisors 
(ICBS) which takes place every two years. 
The Committee's Secretariat is located at the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, and is staffed mainly by professional 
supervisors on temporary secondment from member institutions. In 
addition to undertaking the secretarial work for the Committee and its 
many expert sub-committees, it stands ready to give advice to supervisory 
authorities in all countries. Mr Stefan Walter is the Secretary General of 
the Basel Committee. 
The Committee provides a forum for regular cooperation between its 
member countries on banking supervisory matters. Initially, it discussed 
modalities for international cooperation in order to close gaps in the 
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supervisory net, but its wider objective has been to improve supervisory 
understanding and the quality of banking supervision worldwide. It seeks 
to do this in three principal ways: by exchanging information on national 
supervisory arrangements; by improving the effectiveness of techniques 
for supervising international banking business; and by setting minimum 
supervisory standards in areas where they are considered desirable. 
The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory 
authority. Its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, 
legal force. Rather, it formulates broad supervisory standards and 
guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in the expectation 
that individual authorities will take steps to implement them through 
detailed arrangements -statutory or otherwise- which are best suited to 
their own national systems. In this way, the Committee encourages 
convergence towards common approaches and common standards without 
attempting detailed harmonisation of member countries' supervisory 
techniques. 
One important objective of the Committee's work has been to close gaps in 
international supervisory coverage in pursuit of two basic principles: that 
no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and that 
supervision should be adequate. In May 1983 theCommittee finalised a 
document Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments 
which set down the principles for sharing supervisory responsibility for 
banks' foreign branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures between host and 
parent (or home) supervisory authorities. This document is a revised 
version of a paper originally issued in 1975 which came to be known as 
the "Concordat". The text of the earlier paper was expanded and 
reformulated to take account of changes in the market and to incorporate 
the principle of consolidated supervision of international banking groups 
(which had been adopted in 1978). In April 1990, a Supplement to the 
1983 Concordat was issued with the intention of improving the flow of 
prudential information between banking supervisors in different countries. 
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In June 1992 certain principles of the Concordat were reformulated as 
Minimum Standards. These Standards were communicated to other 
banking supervisory authorities who were invited to endorse them, and in 
July 1992 the Standards were published. 
As an outcome of the ongoing collaboration in the supervision of 
international banks, the Committee has addressed a number of related 
topics. It has collected information on most national systems for 
supervising banks' foreign establishments; it has examined the obstacles to 
effective supervision arising from bank secrecy regulations in different 
countries; and it has studied authorisation procedures for new foreign 
banking establishments. In October 1996, the Committee released a report 
drawn up by a joint working group also containing supervisors from 
offshore centres, which presented proposals for overcoming the 
impediments experienced by banking supervisors in conducting effective 
consolidated supervision of the cross-border operations of international 
banks. This report was endorsed by supervisors from one hundred and 
forty countries who attended the International Conference of Banking 
Supervisors (ICBS) in June 1996 and considerable progress has taken 
place in a number of countries to remove or overcome obstacles to 
effective consolidated supervision. 
The topic to which most of the Committee's time has been devoted in 
recent years is capital adequacy. In the early 1980s, the Committee became 
concerned that the capital ratios of the main international banks were 
deteriorating just at the time that international risks, notably those vis-à-vis 
heavily-indebted countries, were growing. Backed by the Group of Ten 
Governors, the members of the Committee resolved to halt the erosion of 
capital standards in their banking systems and to work towards greater 
convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. This resulted in the 
emergence of a broad consensus on a weighted approach to the 
measurement of risk, both on and off the balance sheet. 
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There was a strong recognition within the Committee of the overriding 
need for a multinational accord to strengthen the stability of the 
international banking system and to remove a source of competitive 
inequality arising from differences in national capital requirements. 
Following comments on a consultative paper published in December 1987, 
a capital measurement system commonly referred to as the Basel Capital 
Accord (or the 1988 Accord) was approved by the G10 Governors and 
released to banks in July 1988. This system provided for the 
implementation of the framework with a minimum capital ratio of capital 
to risk-weighted assets of 8 percent by end-1992. Since 1988, this 
framework has been progressively introduced not only in member 
countries but also in virtually all other countries with active international 
banks. In September 1993, a statement was issued confirming that all the 
banks in the G10 countries with material international banking business 
were meeting the minimum requirements laid down in the 1988 Accord. 
The 1988 capital framework was not intended to be static but to evolve 
over time. In November 1991, it was amended to give greater precision to 
the definition of those general provisions or general loan-loss reserves 
which could be included in capital for purposes of calculating capital 
adequacy. In April 1995, the Committee issued an amendment to the 
Capital Accord, to take effect at end-1995, to recognise the effects of 
bilateral netting of banks' credit exposures in derivative products and to 
expand the matrix of add-on factors. In April 1996, a further document 
was issued explaining how Committee members intended to recognise the 
effects of multilateral netting. 
The Committee has also undertaken work to refine the framework to 
address risks other than credit risk, which was the focus of the 1988 
Accord. In January 1996, following two consultative processes, the 
Committee issued the so-called Market Risk Amendment to the Capital 
38 
Accord, effective end-1997 at the latest, designed to incorporate within the 
Accord a capital requirements for the market risks arising from banks' 
open positions in foreign exchange, traded debt securities, equities, 
commodities and options. An important aspect of this amendment is that, 
as an alternative to a standardised measurement method, banks are 
permitted, subject to strict quantitative and qualitative standards, to use 
internal value-at-risk models as a basis for measuring their market risk 
capital requirements. Much of the preparatory work for the market risk 
package was undertaken jointly with securities regulators and the 
Committee believes it is capable of application to non-bank financial 
institutions. 
In June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy 
framework to replace the 1988 Accord, and this has been refined in the 
intervening years, culminating in the release of the New Capital 
Framework on 26 June 2004. The new Framework consists of three pillars: 
minimum capital requirements, which seek to develop and expand on the 
standardised rules set forth in the 1988 Accord; supervisory review of an 
institution's capital adequacy and internal assessment process; and 
effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and 
encourage safe and sound banking practices. The Committee believes that, 
taken together, these three elements are the essential pillars of an effective 
capital framework. The new Framework is designed to improve the way 
regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks and to better 
address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years, as 
shown, for example, by asset securitisation structures.The changes aim at 
rewarding the improvements in risk measurement and control that have 
occurred and providing incentives for such improvements to continue. 
The publication of the Framework in June 2004 represented the 
culmination of nearly six years of challenging work. During those years, 
the Basel Committee consulted extensively with banks and industry groups 
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in an attempt to develop significantly more risk-sensitive capital 
requirements that are conceptually sound. At the same time, the 
Committee considered the characteristics and needs of markets and 
supervisory systems in numerous countries. To achieve its aims, the 
Committee undertook a careful review of the existing rules and of the 
recent advances attained in the industry. It consulted widely and publicly 
with industry representatives, supervisory agencies, central banks and 
outside observers. 
Following the June 2004 release, which focused primarily on the banking 
book, the Committee turned its attention to the trading book. In close 
cooperation with the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the international body of securities regulators who monitor the 
activities of securities firms and investment houses, the Committee 
published in July 2005 a consensus document governing the treatment of 
banks' trading books under the new Framework. For ease of reference, this 
new text was integrated with the June 2004 text in a comprehensive 
document released in June 2006. 
Committee members, as well as several other countries, have already 
introduced the new rules, or are in the process of introducing them. 
Consistent implementation of the new Framework across borders has 
consequently become a critical and challenging task for the Committee. To 
encourage collaboration and shared approaches, the Committee's Standard 
Implementation Group (SIG) serves as a forum on implementation matters. 
The SIG discusses issues of mutual concern with supervisors outside the 
Committee's membership through its contacts with regional associations. 
One challenge that supervisors worldwide face increasingly under Basel I I 
is the need to approve the use of certain approaches to risk measurement in 
multiple jurisdictions. While this is not a new concept for the supervisory 
community -the Market Risk Amendment of 1996 involved a similar 
requirement- Basel I I extends the scope of such approvals and demands an 
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even greater degree of cooperation between home and host supervisors in 
the future. To help address this challenging issue, the Committee issued 
guidance on information sharing and on supervisory cooperation and 
allocation mechanisms in the context of Advanced Measurement 
Approaches in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
In addition to work on the Concordat and capital standards, the Committee 
has addressed issues of significant supervisory interest. These include 
accounting, auditing, anti-money laundering, and various types of risk, 
such as credit, liquidity, market and operational risk. The work of the 
Committee on these topics often culminates in the publication of 
supervisory guidance, standards or sound practices papers. Recent 
publications address, among other things, liquidity risk management and 
its supervision, bank's financial instrument fair value practices, external 
audit quality, and implementation of compliance principles. 
The Committee issued in July 2009 a package of documents to strengthen 
the Basel I I capital framework, with regard notably to the treatment of 
certain complex securitisation positions, off-balance sheet vehicles and 
trading book exposures. This package also covered key aspects of risk 
managements and disclosure in the context of the Pillar 2 and the Pillar 3 
rules. These enhancements are part of a broader effort the Committee has 
undertaken to strengthen the regulation and supervision of internationally 
active banks, in light of weaknesses revealed by the financial market crisis 
which started in 2007. The 2008 publications of the Committee, on 
liquidity and on valuation issues in particular, reflected part of these 
efforts, but further developments on other aspects are ongoing. In order to 
provide an appropriate and timely response to events which go beyond the 
sole banking sphere, the Committee has been liaising more closely since 
the beginning of the crisis with other relevant international financial 
bodies, like in particular the Financial Stability Forum. 
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The Committee has been working closely with securities and insurance 
supervisors to study the challenges presented by the development of 
diversified financial conglomerates. Initially this cooperation was through 
an informal Tripartite group of supervisors from each of the three sectors. 
This group was succeeded in 1996 by the Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates, constituted under the aegis of the Basel Committee, 
IOSCO and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
The Joint Forum is mandated to elaborate ways to facilitate the exchange 
of information between supervisors and to enhance supervisory 
coordination, and to develop principles toward the more effective 
supervision of financial conglomerates. In addition, the Committee, 
together with IOSCO, has issued ten joint reports since 1995 dealing with 
the management, reporting and disclosure of the derivatives activities of 
banks and securities firms. The Committee and IOSCO have also worked 
together on the capital adequacy of trading activities, as mentioned above. 
The Committee has also undertaken work on a number of technical 
banking and accounting issues in conjunction with outside bodies. These 
include the International Accounting Standards Committee, the 
International Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation 
of Accountants and the International Chamber of Commerce. This work 
has resulted in papers on interbank confirmation procedures, on 
relationships between bank supervisors and external auditors and on 
uniform rules for foreign exchange contracts. In addition, contacts have 
been developed with the European Commission and the European Banking 
Federation. 
In order to enable a wider group of countries to be associated with the 
work being pursued in Basel, the Committee has always encouraged 
contacts and cooperation between its members and other banking 
supervisory authorities. It has circulated to supervisors throughout the 
world published and unpublished papers, as well as more general 
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information about its work. In many cases, supervisory authorities in non-
member countries have seen fit publicly to associate themselves with the 
Committee's initiatives. Contacts have been further strengthened by 
biennial International Conferences of Banking Supervisors. Fifteen such 
conferences have been held to date, the first in London in 1979. The most 
recent conference, hosted jointly by the National Bank of Belgium and the 
Belgian Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission, took place in 
Brussels in September 2008. 
The Basel Committee maintains close relations with a number of fellow 
bank supervisory groupings. These include the Offshore Group of Banking 
Supervisors, with members from the principal offshore banking centres; 
and supervisory groups from the Americas, the Caribbean, from the Arab 
States, from the SEANZA countries of the Indian sub-continent, South¬
East Asia and Australasia, from central and eastern European countries, 
from the African continent and from Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The 
Committee assists these groups in a variety of ways, by providing suitable 
documentation, participating as appropriate in the meetings, offering 
limited Secretariat assistance and hosting meetings between the principals 
to coordinate future work. 
The principles agreed by the Basel Committee have been widely 
disseminated through these international conferences and supervisory 
groupings. A large number of countries outside the Group of Ten have 
given their support to the fundamental objective of ensuring that no 
international banking activity should escape supervision. As a result there 
now remain only a very few territories around the world where banking 
companies are licensed and allowed to operate without serious efforts to 
accompany a licence with effective supervision and cooperation with other 
supervisory authorities. Moreover, the Committee has always worked to 
raise the level of supervisors' consciousness of their mutual 
interdependence where the international activities of banks within their 
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jurisdictions are concerned. The development of close personal contacts 
between supervisors in different countries has greatly helped in the 
handling and resolution of problems affecting individual banks as they 
have arisen. This is an important, though necessarily unpublicised, element 
in the Committee's regular work. 
The wider role of the Committee in promoting sound supervisory 
standards worldwide has intensified. The Communiqué issued by the G7 
Heads of Government following the Lyon Summit in June 1996 called for 
the Committee to participate in efforts to improve supervisory standards in 
the emerging markets. As a result, and in close collaboration with many 
non-G10 supervisory authorities, the Committee in 1997 developed a set 
of Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, which provided a 
comprehensive blueprint for an effective supervisory system. A number of 
steps have been taken to encourage countries to implement the "Core 
Principles", including the establishment of a Liaison group comprised of 
both G10 and non-G10 countries. As a first step to full implementation, an 
assessment of the current situation of a country's compliance with the 
Core Principles should take place. To facilitate implementation and 
assessment, the Basel Committee in October 1999 developed the Core 
Principles Methodology. Over the past year, the Committee has been 
reviewing the Core Principles and the Methodology in close collaboration 
with the assessors and with non-G10 supervisors. Revised versions of the 
two papers were issued in October 2006. 
Until the end of the 1990s, the Basel Committee had organised an active training 
programme on banking supervisory issues. Since 1987, the Secretariat had also 
organised annual supervisory seminars at the BIS for promising young bank 
supervisors, attended by persons from about thirty-five countries worldwide. In 
addition, the Secretariat has conducted several training courses annually at 
regional locations and is regularly invited to lecture at training courses organised 
by the regional groups themselves or other official organisations. In 1999 the 
Bank for International Settlements, in a joint initiative with the Basel Committee, 
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set up the Financial Stability Institute to take over and develop a multi-level 
educational programme. The Committee's Secretariat remains heavily involved in 
efforts to assist bank supervisors from around the world in strengthening their 
surveillance methods by means of an intensive FSI programme of conferences, 
seminars and workshops. 
4.2.1. The Objectives and Role of the Internal Control 
Internal control is a process effected by the board of directors, 
senior management and all levels of personnel. It is not solely a procedure 
or policy that is performed at a certain point in time, but rather it is 
continually operating at all levels within the bank. The board of directors 
and senior management are responsible for establishing the appropriate 
culture to facilitate an effective internal control process and for monitoring 
its effectiveness on an ongoing basis; however, each individual within an 
organisation must participate in the process. The main objectives of the 
internal control process can be categorised as follows: 
1. efficiency and effectiveness of activities (performance objectives); 
2. reliability, completeness and timeliness of financial and management 
information (information objectives); and 
3. compliance with applicable laws and regulations (compliance 
objectives). 
Performance objectives for internal controls pertain to the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the bank in using its assets and other resources and 
protecting the bank from loss. The internal control process seeks to ensure 
that personnel throughout the organisation are working to achieve its goals 
with efficiency and integrity, without unintended or excessive cost or 
placing other interests (such as an employee's, vendor's or customer's 
interest) before those of the bank. 
Information objectives address the preparation of timely, reliable, relevant 
reports needed for decision-making within the banking organisation. They 
also address the need for reliable annual accounts, other financial 
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statements and other financial-related disclosures and reports to 
shareholders, supervisors, and other external parties. The information 
received by management, the board of directors, shareholders and 
supervisors should be of sufficient quality and integrity that recipients can 
rely on the information in making decisions. The term reliable, as it relates 
to financial statements, refers to the preparation of statements that are 
presented fairly and based on comprehensive and well-defined accounting 
principles and rules. 
Compliance objectives ensure that all banking business complies with 
applicable laws and regulations, supervisory requirements, and the 
organisation's policies and procedures. This objective must be met in order 
to protect the bank's franchise and reputation. 
4.2.2. The Major Elements of an Internal Control Process 
The internal control process, which historically has been a 
mechanism for reducing instances of fraud, misappropriation and errors, 
has become more extensive, addressing all the various risks faced by 
banking organisations. It is now recognised that a sound internal control 
process is critical to a bank's ability to meet its established goals, and to 
maintain its financial viability. 
Internal control consists of five interrelated elements: 
1. management oversight and the control culture; 
2. risk recognition and assessment; 
3. control activities and segregation of duties; 
4. information and communication; and 
5. Monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies 
The problems observed in recent large losses at banks can be aligned with 
these five elements. The effective functioning of these elements is 
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essential to achieving a bank's performance, information, and compliance 
objectives. 
1. Management Oversight and the Control Culture 
i) Board of directors 
The board of directors provides governance, guidance and oversight to 
senior management. It is responsible for approving and reviewing the 
overall business strategies and significant policies of the organisation as 
well as the organisational structure. The board of directors has the ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring that an adequate and effective system of 
internal controls is established and maintained. Board members should be 
objective, capable, and inquisitive, with a knowledge or expertise of the 
activities of and risks run by the bank. In those countries where it is an 
option, the board should consist of some members who are independent 
from the daily management of the bank. A strong, active board, 
particularly when coupled with effective upward communication channels 
and capable financial, legal, and internal audit functions, provides an 
important mechanism to ensure the correction of problems that may 
diminish the effectiveness of the internal control system. 
The board of directors should include in its activities (1) periodic 
discussions with management concerning the effectiveness of the internal 
control system, (2) a timely review of evaluations of internal controls 
made by management, internal auditors, and external auditors, (3) periodic 
efforts to ensure that management has promptly followed up on 
recommendations and concerns expressed by auditors and supervisory 
authorities on internal control weaknesses, and (4) a periodic review of the 
appropriateness of the bank's strategy and risk limits. 
One option used by banks in many countries is the establishment of an 
independent audit committee to assist the board in carrying out its 
responsibilities. The establishment of an audit committee allows for 
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detailed examination of information and reports without the need to take 
up the time of all directors. The audit committee is typically responsible 
for overseeing the financial reporting process and the internal control 
system. As part of this responsibility, the audit committee typically 
oversees the activities of, and serves as a direct contact for, the bank's 
internal audit department and engages and serves as the primary contact 
for the external auditors. In those countries where it is an option, the 
committee should be composed mainly or entirely of outside directors (i.e., 
members of the board that are not employed by the bank or any of its 
affiliates) who have knowledge of financial reporting and internal controls. 
It should be noted that in no case should the creation of an audit committee 
amount to a transfer of duties away from the full board, which alone is 
legally empowered to take decisions. 
ii) Senior management 
Senior management is responsible for carrying out the directives of the 
board of directors, including the implementation of strategies and policies 
and the establishment of an effective system of internal control. Members 
of senior management typically delegate responsibility for establishing 
more specific internal control policies and procedures to those responsible 
for a particular business unit. Delegation is an essential part of 
management; however, it is important for senior management to oversee 
the managers to whom they have delegated these responsibilities to ensure 
that they develop and enforce appropriate policies and procedures. 
Compliance with an established internal control system is heavily 
dependent on a well documented and communicated organisational 
structure that clearly shows lines of reporting responsibility and authority 
and provides for effective communication throughout the organisation. 
The allocation of duties and responsibilities should ensure that there are no 
gaps in reporting lines and that an effective level of management control is 
extended to all levels of the bank and its various activities. 
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It is important that senior management takes steps to ensure that activities 
are conducted by qualified staff with the necessary experience and 
technical capabilities. Staff in control functions must be properly 
remunerated. Staff training and skills should be regularly updated. Senior 
management should institute compensation and promotion policies that 
reward appropriate behaviours and minimise incentives for staff to ignore 
or override internal control mechanisms. 
iii) Control culture 
An essential element of an effective system of internal control is a strong 
control culture. It is the responsibility of the board of directors and senior 
management to emphasise the importance of internal control through their 
actions and words. This includes the ethical values that management 
displays in their business dealings, both inside and outside the 
organisation. The words, attitudes and actions of the board of directors and 
senior management affect the integrity, ethics and other aspects of the 
bank's control culture. 
In varying degrees, internal control is the responsibility of everyone in a 
bank. Almost all employees produce information used in the internal 
control system or take other actions needed to effect control. An essential 
element of a strong internal control system is the recognition by all 
employees of the need to carry out their responsibilities effectively and to 
communicate to the appropriate level of management any problems in 
operations, instances of non-compliance with the code of conduct, or other 
policy violations or illegal actions that are noticed. This can best be 
achieved when operational procedures are contained in clearly written 
documentation that is made available to all relevant personnel. It is 
essential that all personnel within the bank understand the importance of 
internal control and are actively engaged in the process. 
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In reinforcing ethical values, banking organisations should avoid policies 
and practices that may inadvertently provide incentives or temptations for 
inappropriate activities. Examples of such policies and practices include 
undue emphasis on performance targets or other operational results, 
particularly short-term ones that ignore longer-term risks; compensation 
schemes that overly depend on short-term performance; ineffective 
segregation of duties or other controls that could allow the misuse of 
resources or concealment of poor performance; and insignificant or overly 
onerous penalties for improper behaviours. 
While having a strong internal control culture does not guarantee that an 
organisation will reach its goals, the lack of such a culture provides greater 
opportunities for errors to go undetected or for improprieties to occur. 
2. Risk Recognition and Assessment 
Banks are in the business of risk-taking. Consequently it is imperative that, 
as part of an internal control system, these risks are being recognised and 
continually assessed. From an internal control perspective, a risk 
assessment should identify and evaluate the internal and external factors 
that could adversely affect the achievement of the banking organisation's 
performance, information and compliance objectives. This process should 
cover all risks faced by the bank and operate at all levels within the bank. 
It differs from the risk management process which typically focuses more 
on the review of business strategies developed to maximise the risk/reward 
trade-off within the different areas of the bank. 
Effective risk assessment identifies and considers internal factors (such as 
the complexity of the organisation's structure, the nature of the bank's 
activities, the quality of personnel, organisational changes and employee 
turnover) as well as external factors (such as fluctuating economic 
conditions, changes in the industry and technological advances) that could 
adversely affect the achievement of the bank's goals. This risk assessment 
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should be conducted at the level of individual businesses and across the 
wide spectrum of activities and subsidiaries of the consolidated banking 
organisation. This can be accomplished through various methods. 
Effective risk assessment addresses both measurable and non-measurable 
aspects of risks and weighs costs of controls against the benefits they 
provide. 
The risk assessment process also includes evaluating the risks to determine 
which are controllable by the bank and which are not. For those risks that 
are controllable, the bank must assess whether to accept those risks or the 
extent to which it wishes to mitigate the risks through control procedures. 
For those risks that cannot be controlled, the bank must decide whether to 
accept these risks or to withdraw from or reduce the level of business 
activity concerned. 
In order for risk assessment, and therefore the system of internal control, to 
remain effective, senior management needs to continually evaluate the 
risks affecting the achievement of its goals and react to changing 
circumstances and conditions. Internal controls may need to be revised to 
appropriately address any new or previously uncontrolled risks. For 
example, as financial innovation occurs, a bank needs to evaluate new 
financial instruments and market transactions and consider the risks 
associated with these activities. Often these risks can be best understood 
when considering how various scenarios (economic and otherwise) affect 
the cash flows and earnings of financial instruments and transactions. 
Thoughtful consideration of the full range of possible problems, from 
customer misunderstanding to operational failure, will point to important 
control considerations. 
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3. Control Activities and Segregation of Duties 
Control activities are designed and implemented to address the risks that 
the bank identified through the risk assessment process described above. 
Control activities involve two steps: (1) the establishment of control 
policies and procedures; and (2) verification that the control policies and 
procedures are being complied with. Control activities involve all levels of 
personnel in the bank, including senior management as well as front line 
personnel. Examples of control activities include: 
• Top level reviews - Boards of directors and senior management often 
request presentations and performance reports that enable them to review 
the bank's progress toward its goals. For example, senior management 
may review reports showing actual financial results to date versus the 
budget. Questions that senior management generates as a result of this 
review and the ensuing responses of lower levels of management represent 
a control activity which may detectproblems such as control weaknesses, 
errors in financial reporting or fraudulent activities. 
• Activity controls - Department or division level management receives and 
reviews standard performance and exception reports on a daily, weekly or 
monthly basis. Functional reviews occur more frequently than top-level 
reviews and usually are more detailed. For instance, a manager of 
commercial lending may review weekly reports on delinquencies, 
payments received, and interest income earned on the portfolio, while the 
senior credit officer may review similar reports on a monthly basis and in a 
more summarised form that includes all lending areas. As with the top¬
level review, the questions that are generated as a result of reviewing the 
reports and the responses to those questions represent the control activity. 
• Physical controls - Physical controls generally focus on restricting access 
to tangible assets, including cash and securities. Control activities include 
physicallimitations, dual custody, and periodic inventories. 
• Compliance with exposure limits - The establishment of prudent limits on 
risk exposures is an important aspect of risk management. For example, 
compliancewith limits for borrowers and other counterparties reduces the 
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bank'sconcentration of credit risk and helps to diversify its risk profile. 
Consequently, an important aspect of internal controls is a process for 
reviewing compliance with such limits and follow-up on instances of non-
compliance. 
• Approvals and authorisations - Requiring approval and authorisation for 
transactions over certain limits ensures that an appropriate level of 
management is aware of the transaction or situation, and helps to establish 
accountability. 
• Verifications and reconciliations - Verifications of transaction details and 
activities and the output of risk management models used by the bank are 
important control activities. Periodic reconciliations, such as those 
comparing cash flows to account records and statements, may identify 
activities and records that need correction. Consequently, the results of 
these verifications should be reported to the appropriate levels of 
management whenever problems or potential problems are detected. 
Control activities are most effective when they are viewed by management 
and all other personnel as an integral part of, rather than an addition to, the 
daily activities of the bank. When controls are viewed as an addition to the 
day-to-day activities, they are often seen as less important and may not be 
performed in situations where individuals feel pressured to complete 
activities in a limited amount of time. In addition, controls that are an 
integral part of the daily activities enable quick responses to changing 
conditions and avoid unnecessary costs. As part of fostering the 
appropriate control culture within the bank, senior management should 
ensure that adequate control activities are an integral part of the daily 
functions of all relevant personnel. 
It is not sufficient for senior management to simply establish appropriate 
policies and procedures for the various activities and divisions of the bank. 
They must regularly ensure that all areas of the bank are in compliance 
with such policies and procedures and also determine that existing policies 
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and procedures remain adequate. This is usually a major role of the 
internal audit function. 
"Principle 6: An effective internal control system requires that there is 
appropriate segregation of duties and that personnel are not assigned conflicting 
responsibilities. Areas of potential conflicts of interest should be identified, 
minimised, and subject to careful, independent monitoring." 
In reviewing major banking losses caused by poor internal controls, 
supervisors typically find that one of the major causes of such losses is the 
lack of adequate segregation of duties. Assigning conflicting duties to one 
individual (for example, responsibility for both the front and back offices 
of a trading function) gives that person access to assets of value and the 
ability to manipulate financial data for personal gain or to conceal losses. 
Consequently, certain duties within a bank should be split, to the extent 
possible, among various individuals in order to reduce the risk of 
manipulation of financial data or misappropriation of assets. 
Segregation of duties is not limited to situations involving simultaneous 
front and back office control by one individual. It can also result in serious 
problems when there are not appropriate controls in those instances where 
an individual has responsibility for: 
• approval of the disbursement of funds and the actual disbursement; 
• customer and proprietary accounts; 
• transactions in both the "banking" and "trading" books; 
• informally providing information to customers about their positions 
while 
• marketing to the same customers; 
• assessing the adequacy of loan documentation and monitoring the 
borrower after loan origination; and 
• any other areas where significant conflicts of interest emerge and are 
not 
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mitigated by other factors. 
Shortcomings in control activities, however, reflect the failure of a variety 
of efforts to determine that business is being conducted in the expected 
manner, from high-level reviews to maintenance of specific checks and 
balances in a business process. For example, in several cases management 
did not appropriately respond to information they were receiving. This 
information took the form of periodic reports on the results of operations 
for all divisions of the organisation that informed management of each 
division's progress in meeting objectives, and allowed them to ask 
questions i f the results were different from their expectations. Often, the 
divisions that later reported significant losses at first reported profits -far in 
excess of expectations for the apparent level of risk-that should have 
concerned senior management. Had thorough top level reviews occurred, 
senior management may have investigated the anomalous results and 
found and addressed some of the problems, thus limiting or preventing the 
losses that occurred. However, because the deviations from their 
expectations were positive (i.e., profits), questions were not asked and 
investigations were not 
started until the problems had grown to unmanageable proportions. 
4. Information and Communication 
Some banks have experienced losses because information in the 
organisation was not reliable or complete and because communication 
within the organisation was not effective. Financial information may be 
misreported internally; incorrect data series from outside sources may be 
used to value financial positions; and small, but high-risk activities may 
not be reflected in management reports. In some cases, banks failed to 
adequately communicate employees' duties and control responsibilities or 
disseminated policies through channels, such as electronic mail, that did 
not ensure that the policy was read, understood and 
retained. As a result, for long periods of time, major management policies 
were not carried out. In other cases, adequate lines of communication did 
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not exist for the reporting of suspected improprieties by employees. I f 
channels had been established for communication of problems upward 
through the organisational levels, management would have been able to 
identify and correct the improprieties much sooner. 
5. Monitoring Activities and Correcting Deficiencies 
Many banks that have experienced losses from internal control problems 
did not effectively monitor their internal control systems. Often the 
systems did not have the necessary built-in ongoing monitoring processes 
and the separate evaluations performed were either not adequate or were 
not acted upon appropriately by management. 
In some cases, the absence of monitoring began with a failure to consider 
and react to day-to-day information provided to line management and 
other personnel indicating unusual activity, such as exceeded exposure 
limits, customer accounts in proprietary business activities, or lack of 
current financial statements from borrowers. In one bank, losses associated 
with trading activities were being concealed in a fictitious customer 
account. I f the organisation had a procedure in place that required 
statements of accounts to be mailed to customers on a monthly basis and 
that customer accounts be periodically confirmed, the concealed losses 
would likely have been noticed long before they were large enough to 
cause major problems for the bank. 
In several other cases, the organisation's division or activity that caused 
massive losses had numerous characteristics indicating a heightened level 
of risk such as unusual profitability for the perceived level of risk and 
rapid growth in a new business activity that was geographically distant 
from the parent organisation. However, due to inadequate risk assessment, 
the organisations did not provide sufficient additional resources to control 
or monitor the high-risk activities. In fact, in some instances, the high risk 
activities were operating with less oversight than activities with much 
lower risk profiles and several warnings from the internal and external 
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auditors regarding the activities of the division were not acted upon by 
management. 
While internal audit can be an effective source of separate evaluations, it 
was not effective in many problem banking organisations. A combination 
of three factors contributed to these inadequacies: the performance of 
piecemeal audits, the lack of a thorough understanding of the business 
processes, and inadequate follow-up when problems were noted. The 
fragmented audit approach resulted primarily because the internal audit 
programs were structured as a series of discrete audits of specific activities 
within the same division or department, within geographic areas, or within 
legal entities. Because the audit process was fragmented, the business 
processes were not fully understood by internal audit personnel. An audit 
approach that would have allowed the auditors to follow processes and 
functions through from beginning to end (i.e., follow a single transaction 
through from the point of transaction initiation to financial reporting 
phase) would have enabled them to gain a beter understanding. Moreover, 
it would have provided the opportunity to verify and test the adequacy of 
controls at every step of the process. 
In some cases, inadequate knowledge and training of internal audit staff in 
trading products and markets, electronic information systems, and other 
highly sophisticated areas also contributed to internal audit problems. 
Because the staff did not have the necessary expertise, they were often 
hesitant to ask questions when they suspected problems, and when 
questions were asked, they were more likely to accept an answer than to 
challenge it. 
Internal audit may also be rendered ineffective when management does not 
appropriately follow-up on problems identified by auditors. The delays 
may have occurred because of a lack of acceptance by management of the 
role and importance of internal audit. In addition, the effectiveness of 
internal audit was impaired when senior management and members of the 
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board of directors (or audit committee, as appropriate) failed to receive 
timely and regular tracking reports that indicated critical issues and the 
subsequent corrective actions taken by management. This type of periodic 
tracking device can help senior management confront important issues in a 
timely manner. 
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5. INTERNAL CONTROL IN TURKISH BANKING 
5.1. Structural Legislations in Turkish Banking 
At the end of 1999, a Stand-By Agreement was signed with the 
International Monetary Fund, which aims at fighting with inflation, 
implementing monetary and exchange rate policies as well as fiscal 
policy strategies and structural reforms. The disinflation program, 
which is the core target of the agreement, rests on three pillars: 
• Up-front fiscal adjustment at the very beginning of the program 
• A firm exchange-rate commitment supported by consistent income 
policies 
• Structural reforms 
The disinflation program has been supported by the structural reforms in 
three fundamental areas; namely banking sector, social security and 
international arbitration. The most recent structural reforms are the 
reflections that Turkey has finally decided to act upon its long lasting 
problems. It is widely recognized that the chronic high inflation is the 
main problem that hinders the economy from attaining a sustainable rate of 
growth and integrating into the global world economy. A more effective 
supervision and surveillance of banking systems are of the greatest 
importance among today's international banking regulations. In this 
context, Turkey is now more eager to take additional measures that will 
strengthen the financial structure of banking sector and lead to a more 
effective supervision and surveillance of the system. 
The most radical change towards strengthening the supervision and 
financial structures of banks is the new Banking Law (No.4389). With the 
new Banking Law, which was prepared by taking into account the 
European Union directives and other generally accepted international 
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practices, the compliance with the international standards in the field of 
banking supervision, which is an on-going process, was mostly achieved, 
in addition to increase the efficiency of supervision and surveillance of 
banking system towards the main target of establishing stability and 
soundness of the system. The main changes to be brought by the new 
Banking Law No.4389, which was superseded by the Law No.4491, are as 
follows: 
1. Establishment of Banking Regulation and Supervision Board 
(BRSB) as an organizationally and financially autonomous body, 
independent of political authority, 
2. Transfer of powers on banking supervision and surveillance to 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Board, 
3. The requirements of bank foundation were made more demanding, 
4. Banks are required to establish appropriate internal control and risk 
management systems, 
5. Definition of large exposures and credit limits, 
6. More detailed and comprehensive measures shall be taken against 
banks, whose financial conditions weaken severely, 
7. Personal obligations of bank shareholders and managers for the 
misuse of bank resources shall be increased. 
Turkey's effort in adapting to international banking regulations and her 
unceasing efforts towards this goal is worth to be mentioned. As compared 
to similar developing countries, it will not be wrong to say that Turkish 
public authorities and banking system closely monitor the developments in 
the international financial systems and they are quite sensitive to enforce 
the necessary regulations within this scope. With the awareness of the fact 
that the soundness of the banking system is of vital importance in an 
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environment where banks are major player in financial system and are 
involved in international banking activities, Turkey is continuing to take 
measures to improve both the quality and the effectiveness of banking 
surveillance system on basis of the EU directives and BIS principles. 
In October 2005, a new banking law was passed (Banking Law 5411, of 
October 19th 2005, published in the Official Gazette 25983, of November 
1st 2005), superseding Banking Law 4389, of June 18th 1999 (published 
in the Official Gazette 23734, of June 23rd 1999). 
The new law was in response to IMF pressure on Turkey to improve its 
supervisory and regulatory environment. It increased the regulatory 
powers of the Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency (BRSA), 
including granting it the right to conduct on-site inspections, determine 
corporate governance structures, determine processes and principles, and 
amend the Turkish regulatory framework to bring it into line with that of 
the EU. 
According to Article 54 of Law 5411, the total amount of financing a bank 
may provide to a group of real or legal persons, who are in direct or 
indirect credit relationships, may not exceed 25% of the bank's own funds. 
It also retained the concept introduced under Law 4389 of "major credits" 
(defined in Article 54 of Law 5411 as financing in excess of 10% of the 
bank's own funds). The total of such major credits cannot be eight times 
the bank's total funds (equity capital/resources). 
Banks are required to maintain minimum net-worth-to-risk-asset ratios of 
8%, in line with the standards set by the Basel-based Bank for 
International Settlements. Banks' net general foreign-currency positions 
are restricted to a maximum 20% of their capital base. 
Investment banks are forbidden from accepting deposits. Apart from this 
restriction, all banks registered in Turkey are theoretically able to 
undertake almost any type of financial business-from underwriting 
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securities to straight lending and deposit taking. Under Article 79 of Law 
5411, all banks are required to become members of the Banks Association 
of Turkey within one month of receiving their operating permits. 
The BRSA, answerable directly to the prime minister and the Council of 
Ministers, oversees the implementation and supervision of banking 
regulations. The institution began operations at the beginning of 
September 2000. 
The BRSA is also responsible for approving applications to establish new 
banks and submit successful applications to the Council of Ministers for 
ratification. Banks resident in Turkey seek permission from the BRSA for 
mergers and liquidations and before establishing partnerships with 
individuals or corporations based outside the country. Under Law No. 
5411, the BRSA is now responsible for the principles and procedures 
related to liquidity requirements. 
5.2. Constitutional Regulations About Internal Control 
In the Regulation on Banks' Internal Control and Risk Management 
Systems (Published in the Official Gazette, issue no. 24312, on 8 February 
2001) internal control function is described as all of the control activities 
which are performed under the governance and organizational structure 
established by the bank's board of directors and senior management and in 
which each individual within the organization must participate in order to 
ensure proper, efficient and effective performing of the bank's activities in 
accordance with the management strategy and policies, and applicable 
laws and regulations and to ensure the integrity and reliability of 
accounting system and timeliness and accessibility of information in the 
data system; and internal control system as all of the financial, operational 
and other control systems which are carried out by internal controllers and 
which involve monitoring, independent evaluation and timely reporting to 
management levels systematically in order to ensure that all the bank 
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activities are performed by management levels in accordance with current 
policies, methods, instructions and limits. 
According to The Regulation on the Internal System of Banks (Published in 
the Official Gazette dated November 1, 2006 Nr. 26333) For the purpose of 
monitoring and controlling the risks to which they are exposed, banks must 
establish and operate adequate and effective internal systems in conformity 
with the scope and nature of their activities, capable of adaptation to 
changing conditions, and covering all their branches and units, and their 
partnerships subjected to consolidation in accordance with regulations 
introduced on the basis of the Law, in the framework of the procedures and 
principles stipulated in this Regulation. (Article 4) 
The units included within the scope of the internal systems shall be 
established under the board of directors, within the institutional structure 
of the bank. The board of directors may transfer all or part of its duties and 
responsibilities concerning the internal systems to the officer in charge of 
these systems. Several officers in charge of the internal systems may be 
appointed on condition that their duties and responsibilities are segregated 
on the basis of the units included within the scope of the internal systems. 
The responsibility for the internal systems may only be assigned to one of 
the non-executive directors or to committees composed of such directors 
or to the audit committee. In the event that the director in charge of the 
internal systems, or a member of the committee in charge of the internal 
systems, resigns or is removed from such office, such that, in the latter 
case, the number of members falls below two, or ceases to have the 
required qualifications, a director with the same qualifications must be 
appointed in lieu of him within fifteen days. 
Banks shall determine procedures and principles for the institutional 
structure and functioning of their internal systems, also considering the 
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scope and nature of their activities, on condition that such procedures and 
principles are not contrary to the provisions of this Regulation. 
The board of directors shall have the ultimate responsibility for 
establishing the internal systems in accordance with the procedures and 
principles specified in this Regulation (Article 5), operating them in an 
effective, adequate and suitable manner, securing the information provided 
from the accounting and financial reporting system, and determining the 
powers and responsibilities within the bank. 
According to Article 6, the board of directors shall appoint at least two non-
executive directors from among itself as members of the bank audit 
committee to assist the board of directors in carrying out its audit and 
supervision activities. 
The audit committee shall have the duty and responsibility, on behalf of 
the board of directors, to supervise the efficiency and adequacy of the 
bank's internal systems, the functioning of these systems and of the 
accounting and reporting systems in accordance with the Law and 
applicable regulations, and the integrity of the information that is 
generated, to carry out the necessary preliminary assessment for the 
selection of independent audit institutions and rating, valuation and 
support service institutions by the board of directors, to monitor regularly 
the activities of the institutions selected by the board of directors and with 
which contracts have been signed, and to ensure that the internal audit 
activities of the partnerships subject to consolidation in accordance with 
regulations introduced under the Law are maintained and coordinated in 
the consolidated fashion. (Article 7) 
According to the regulation (Article 8) the top-level management shall 
have the duty and responsibility: 
a) To develop proposals concerning practices which are considered 
necessary for performing the activities as is due within the scope of their 
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duties and responsibilities, ensuring the efficiency of these activities and 
developing them; 
b) To coordinate the bank personnel employed in the units for which they 
are responsible, to make a division of tasks among such personnel in view 
of their competencies and to monitor whether they effectively perform 
their duties and responsibilities; 
c) To analyse deficiencies or errors arising in the units for which they are 
responsible and to report these or the measures considered necessary to the 
relevant internal systems officer; 
d) To use initiative according to their authorization where unexpected 
circumstances arise; 
e) To make timely and reliable reporting to the board of directors about 
important risks to which the bank is exposed; and 
f) To perform other tasks assigned by the board of directors. 
Article 15 is about the control of actions to execute activities of banks 
constitute the operational activities. The aim of the controls related to 
operational activities is to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations. Banks must implement the following control activities in 
relation to operational activities. 
Reporting: Preparation of daily, weekly or monthly reports on 
extraordinary events, doubtful transactions, non-conformities, and general 
performance, for submission to the senior management. 
Physical controls: Setting rules and limitations on access to, and utilization 
and keeping of, tangible assets, including financial assets such as cash and 
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securities owned by the bank or held in custody in the name of clients or 
other parties, and making inventories of all tangible assets at regular intervals; 
Approval and authorization: Establishing bilateral and cross verification 
and signature procedures, and obtaining approval or authorization for 
transactions above certain limits. 
Interrogation and reconciliation: Interrogating the accuracy of transaction 
details, activities, and outputs related to risk management models, comparing 
the accounts, and carrying out reconciliations at regular intervals. 
Checks of compliance with limits and monitoring of violations and non-
conformities: Checking compliance with general and special risk limits and 
monitoring violations of limits. 
Article 19 is about The Internal Control Unit. According to this article the 
internal control system, the internal control activities, and how they are to 
be executed, shall be designed by the internal control unit together with the 
toplevel managers of the other relevant units, having considered the 
characteristics of all activities carried out by the bank. 
The internal control unit shall be staffed with one manager and with 
professionally qualified personnel in a sufficient number according to the 
scale of the bank and the nature and complexity of its activities. The 
internal control unit shall be physically located within the head office of 
the bank. 
In the case of banks established abroad which operate in Turkey through 
branch offices, the internal control unit shall be created in the central 
branch office. 
Whether the internal control activities are carried out, whether the rules 
and limitations are complied with and whether the targets have been 
reached shall be checked at the various management levels specified and at 
the relevant control steps and points and shall be reported by the internal 
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control personnel to the internal control unit through normal means or 
urgently, also considering the nature of the findings. 
The procedures and principles concerning the distribution of internal 
control activities between the personnel carrying out the operational 
activities of the bank and the internal control personnel, the number of 
internal control personnel to be allocated for each internal control activity, 
and the control mechanisms and methods to be used, shall be determined 
jointly by the manager of the internal control unit and the high-level 
management concerned. The coordination and cooperation of the internal 
control personnel with the other personnel conducting the activities of the 
bank in the location where the internal control personnel perform their 
duties shall be ensured by the internal control unit. 
Control results reported to the internal control unit shall be kept in this 
unit. Such reports shall be separated as between those made by the 
operational personnel and those made by the internal control personnel and 
shall be further classified according to their nature. The reports so grouped 
shall be evaluated by the manager of the internal control unit and the 
relevant high-level management, and the necessary measures shall be 
taken to improve the internal control system or to conduct the internal 
control activities without any disruption. 
In periods of up to three months each, the audit committee shall be 
provided with information concerning actions mentioned above. 
The manager of the internal control unit must have a minimum of seven years 
experience in banking. The manager of the internal control unit shall assess 
whether the internal control personnel have the qualifications that are required 
by their duties, powers and responsibilities, shall prepare training programmes 
to improve their professional knowledge, skills and abilities, and shall 
monitor whether they are performing their duties impartially without being 
influenced by the executive units. 
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Article 20 expresses the duties and powers of internal control personel; the 
internal control personnel attached to the internal control unit shall conduct 
their duties in the units or branches where the operational activities are 
executed and in the head office. Banks may keep permanent internal 
control personnel in certain branches, considering the share of the branch 
activities in the total business volume of the bank, the operational risks 
carried by those branches, their impact within the total risk profile of the 
bank, their numbers of personnel, and the possibilities of controlling their 
daily activities from the centre. The posts of the internal control personnel 
shall be changed at intervals considered appropriate by the manager of the 
internal control unit. The internal control personnel shall not engage in any 
activity other than internal control activities. 
The internal control personnel shall request information based on reports 
from the units concerned in order to monitor, review and control the 
reliable performance of all activities of the bank, shall implement controls 
or reviews based on general or special observations and monitoring 
through various control documents and tools, shall put their findings in the 
form of reports, and shall prepare warning messages and communicate 
them to the units concerned. The internal control personnel shall be 
provided with the authority to demand additional explanations from bank 
personnel concerning matters which they monitor, review and control, and 
to seek their opinions. 
The internal control unit regulations, prepared by the internal control unit, 
considered appropriate by the relevant internal systems officer, and 
approved and adopted by the board of directors, shall include provisions 
concerning the required educational status, experience, levels of 
knowledge and skill, and other qualifications of internal control personnel. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
In this section, statistical methods used for the the collection and analysis 
of data of the variables in COSO internal control evaluation model and 
findings emerging from these methods are explained. In the analysis of 
collected statistical data, SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) 
version 17 and Microsoft Excel 2007 software were used. 
6.1. Collection and Evaluation of Data 
For the data used in this study, a questionnaire was created based on the 
model COSO which is used to evaluate the efectiveness of banks. The 
questionnaire is consist of 7 sections and 26 questions. The first question is 
to get information about the structure of the bank concerning its subject to 
regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles. The following 5 
sections are the basical components of COSO. Internal control consists of 
five interrelated components. These are derived from the way management 
runs a business, and are integrated with the management process. Although 
the components apply to all banks, small and mid-size banks may 
implement them differently than large ones. Its controls may be less formal 
and less structured, yet a small bank can stil have effective internal control. 
The components are: 
• Control Environment 
• Risk Assessment 
• Control Activities 
• Information and Communication 
• Monitoring 
The survey forms were sent to the Centers' of Internal Control Units of 12 
private bank in Istanbul, by e-mail. Managers or directors of each internal 
control unit were informed about the aim and the significance of the 
survey by talking in person. Afterall, 146 forms were evaluated. 
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6.2. The Tests and the Analysis Methods Used in the Study 
To evaluate the effectiveness of internal control system different statistical 
tests and analysis are employed. The independent t-test is used to for a 
difference between two independent groups (like males and females) on 
the means of a continuous variable (Kalaycı (2006)).The sample group, t-
test was used for is as follows: 
• The banks those are subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel 
Principles in all areas. 
• The banks those are NOT subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel 
Principles in all areas. 
The relationship between the sample group and the objectives of internal 
control has been tested by independent t-test. 
Regression analysis includes any techniques for modeling and analyzing 
several variables, when the focus is on the relationship between a 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. More 
specifically, regression analysis helps us understand how the typical value 
of the dependent variable changes when any one of the independent 
variables is varied, while the other independent variables are held fixed. 
In the study, the dependent variables are: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
• Reliability of financial reporting. 
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
The independent variables are: 
i) Control Environment, 
ii) Risk Assessment, 
iii) Control Activities, 
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iv) Information and Communication, and 
v) Monitoring 
Through the regression analysis, the effects of five independent variables 
on the dependent variables were investigted. 
6.3. Findings 
This study is applied to the internal control unit staff and senior managers. 
Demographic characteristics of the 146 answer examined is as below: 
Table 1: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas 
Frequency Percentage 
Y E S 93 63,7 
NO 53 36,3 
6.4. The Effect of Internal Control System on the Effectiveness and 
Efficiency of operations 
6.4.1 The Effect of Basel Principles 
H0: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas does not have an effect on Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
H1: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas does have an effect on Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
The above hypotheses were tested using independent t test carried out with 
95% confidence interval. 
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Table 2:Classification of the mean of the first objective 
Is your bank subject to 
regulations stipulated by 
the Basel Principles in all 
areas? 
N Mean 
Operations are effective 
and efficient. 
Y E S 93 4,1539 
NO 53 3,091 
Test result ( Sig. (2-tailed) = 0,000) is smaller than 0.05. It shows us; there 
is a significant difference between means. So that; H0 hypothesis was 
rejected, hypothesis H1 is accepted. 
It means being subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles, has 
a positive distinctive effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations. 
6.4.2. The Effect of the Components of Internal Control 
In this part of the study the correlations between the first objective; 
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations and each component of internal 
control were investigated. 
Component of Control 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Control Environment 0,682 
Risk Assessment 0,631 





Dependent variable: Effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations 
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Table 3:Coefficients of correlation between the first dependent variable and 
each of the control component 
When the correlation coefficients above were examined it was seen that 
there is a greater correlation especially between the component; 
"Information and Communication" and the objective "effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations." 
6.5. The Effect of Internal Control System on the Reliability of 
Financial Reporting. 
6.5.1 The Effect of Basel Principles 
H0: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas does not have an effect on the reliability of financial reporting. 
H1: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas does have an effect on the reliability of financial reporting. 
The above hypotheses were tested using independent t test carried out with 
95% confidence interval. 
Table 4: Classification of the mean of the second objective 
Is your bank subject to 
regulations stipulated by 
the Basel Principles in all 
areas? 
N Mean 
Financial reporting is 
reliable. 
Y E S 93 4,3847 
NO 53 3,4545 
Test result ( Sig. (2-tailed) = 0,000) is smaller than 0.05. It shows us; there 
is a significant difference between means. So that; H0 hypothesis was 
rejected, hypothesis H1 is accepted. 
It means being subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles, has 
a positive distinctive effect on the reliability of financial reporting. 
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6.5.2. The Effect of the Components of Internal Control 
The correlations between the second objective; reliability of 
financial reporting and each component of internal control were 
investigated as below: 
Table 5: Coefficients of correlation between the second dependent variable 
and each of the control component 
Component of Control 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Control Environment 0,665 
Risk Assessment 0,589 





Dependent variable: Reliability of 
financial reporting 
When the correlation coefficients above were examined it was seen that 
there is a greater correlation especially between the component; "Control 
Activities" and reliability of financial reporting. 
6.6. The Effect of Internal Control System on the Compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. 
6.6.1. The Effect of Basel Principles 
H0: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas does not have an effect on the compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. 
H1: To be subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles in all 
areas does have an effect on the compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. 
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The above hypotheses were tested using independent t test carried out with 
95% confidence interval. 
Table 6: Classification of the mean of the third objective 
Is your bank subject to 
regulations stipulated by 




applicable laws and 
regulations. 
Y E S 93 4,5387 
NO 53 3,591 
Test result ( Sig. (2-tailed) = 0,000) is smaller than 0.05. It shows us; there 
is a significant difference between means. So that; H0 hypothesis was 
rejected, hypothesis H1 is accepted. 
It means being subject to regulations stipulated by the Basel Principles, has 
a positive distinctive effect on the compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. 
6.6.2. The Effect of the Components of Internal Control 
The correlations between the third objective; compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations and each component of internal control 
were investigated as below: 
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Component of Control 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Control Environment 0,504 
Risk Assessment 0,385 





Dependent variable: Compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations 
Table 7: Coefficients of correlation between the third dependent variable 
and each of the control component 
When the correlation coefficients above were examined it was seen that 
there is a greater correlation especially between the components; "Control 
Activities and Information&Communication" and compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Internal control, as it was defined by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, represents "a continuous process in which takes part the 
board of directors, senior management and all level of personnel, and 
whose aim is to ensure that all the established goals will be reached." We 
have to stress that internal control is not just a procedure or a policy, 
performed at a certain point in time, but rather it is a continually operating 
action at all levels within the bank. 
Considering the stipulations of the same regulations, the main objectives 
of the internal control process are: 
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 
• Reliability of financial reporting. 
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
The first mentioned is the performance objective and it refers to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the bank in using its assets and other 
resources and, therefore in protecting the bank from loss. By its rules, the 
internal control needs to ensure that the personnel throughout the bank are 
working to achieve its goals with efficiency and integrity, without 
excessive costs or placing other interests before those of the bank. 
The second mentioned is the information objective, which regards the 
preparation of timely, reliable and relevant reports needed for decision-
making within the bank. It also addresses the need for financial statements, 
reliable annual accounts and other financial information for shareholders, 
board of directors, supervisors and other external parties, whose quality 
and integrity are absolutely necessary in making decisions. 
The last mentioned is the compliance objective, which needed to be 
reached in order to protect the bank's franchise and reputation, by 
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respecting the laws and regulations, the supervisory requirements and the 
organisation's policies and procedures. 
As a conclusion, i f the internal control system is properly designed, and 
there is a continuous cooperation between the entire bank's staff, it might 
bring a lot of benefits to the organisation as a whole, that we are going to 
present, as it follows. Thus, a system of effective internal controls: 
• is a critical component of bank management and a foundation for 
the safe and sound operations of banks; 
• contributes to the accomplishment of the bank's goals, objectives 
and long-term profitability targets; 
• contributes to the maintenance of reliable financial and managerial 
reporting, as well as to compliance with laws, regulations, policies, plans 
and internal rules and procedures; 
• decreases the risk of unexpected losses and the risk of damage to 
the bank's reputation. 
Besides the strengths mentioned above, required for a strong internal 
control system, we have to be aware that it also might have a lot of 
weaknesses. 
Thus, as important as an internal control structure is to an organisation, an 
effective system is not a guarantee that the organisation will be successful. 
An effective internal control structure will keep the right people informed 
about the organisation's progress (or lack of progress) in achieving its 
objectives, but it cannot turn a poor manager into a good one. Internal 
control cannot ensure success, or even survival. Internal control is not an 
absolute assurance to management and the board of directors about the 
organisation's achievement of its objectives. It can only provide reasonable 
assurance, due to limitations inherent in all internal control systems. For 
example, breakdowns in the internal control structure can occur due to a 
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simple error or mistake, as well as faulty judgments that could be made at 
any level of management. (Palfi, Cristina and Mariana Muresan (2009)) 
The types of control breakdowns typically seen in problem bank cases 
were grouped by the Basle Committee into the following five categories: 
(Palfi, Cristina and Mariana Muresan (2009)) 
i) Lack of adequate management oversight and accountability, and 
failure to develop a strong internal control culture within the bank. 
Without exception, cases of major losses reflect management 
inattention to, and laxity in, the control culture of the bank, 
insufficient guidance and oversight by board of directors and senior 
management, and a lack of clear management accountability 
through the assignment of roles and responsibilities. These cases 
also reflect a lack of appropriate incentives for management to 
carry out strong line supervision and maintain a high level of 
control consciousness within business areas. 
ii) Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk of certain 
banking activities, whether on- or off-balance sheet. Many banking 
organisation that have suffered major losses neglected to recognise 
and assess the risks of new products and activities, or update their 
risk assessment when significant changes occurred in the 
environment or business conditions. Many cases highlight the fact 
that control systems that function well for traditional or simple 
products are unable to handle more sophisticated or complex 
products. 
iii) The absence or failure of key control structures and activities, such 
as segregation of duties, approvals, verifications, reconciliations 
and reviews of operating performance. 
79 
iv) Inadequate communication of information between levels of 
management within the bank, especially in the upward 
communication of problems. To be effective, policies and 
procedures need to be effectively communicated to all personnel 
involved in an activity. Some losses in banks have occurred 
because relevant personnel were not aware of or did not understand 
the bank's policies. In several instances, information about 
inappropriate activities that should have been reported upward 
through organisational levels was not communicated to the board 
of directors or senior management until the problems became 
severe. In other instances, information in management reports was 
not complete or accurate, creating a falsely favourable impression 
of business situation. 
v) Inadequate or ineffective audit programs and monitoring activities. 
In many cases, auditors were not sufficiently rigorous to identify 
and report the control weaknesses associated with problem banks. 
In other cases, even though auditors reported problems, no 
mechanism was in place to ensure that management corrected the 
deficiencies. 
The conclusion reached by these experiences, after analysing the five 
major elements of the internal control process defined by the Basel 
Committee (management oversight and the control culture, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication, 
monitoring) is that an efficient internal control system might have prevent 
or detect from time the problems that led to losses, or that at least could 
have limit their value. So, an efficient internal control system is a 
significant part of a bank's management, which could sustain a bank in 
reaching its objectives and its goals of profitability. 
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A N K E T 
Değerli İç Kontrol mensubu, 
Bu anket, Turkiye'de faaliyet gösteren bankaların İç Kontrol Sistemlerinin 
Etkinliğinin Değerlendirilmesi konusunda İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 
Uluslararası Finans Yüksek Lisans Bölümünde gerçekleştirilen bir tez 
çalışmasına temel oluşturacaktır. 
Bu çalısmanın sonucunda ulaşılacak bilgiler Bankanızla da paylaşılca olup 
tamamen bilimsel amaçlarla yapılan bu çalışmaya verilecek cevaplar hiç 
bir yerde yayınlanmayacak ve kesinlikle gizli tutulacaktır. 
Anketi cevaplayarak çalışmamıza yapmış olduğunuz katkıdan dolayı 
teşekkür ederiz. 
Okan AYBAR M.Burak ÖZBEK 
Tez Çalışması Yöneticisi Uluslararası Finans Yüksek Lisans Öğrencisi 
1. Bankanız, Basel Prensiplerinin öngördüğü düzenlemelere her 
alanda tabi midir? ( Lütfen uygun kutucuğu işaretleyiniz.) 
Evet • Hayır • 
2. İç kontrol sistemi için sağlanmış kontrol ortamı açısından 
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz. 
1- Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum 2- Katılmıyorum 3- Ne katılıyorum ne 
katılmıyorum 4-Katılıyorum 5- Kesinlikle Katılıyorum 
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1 2 3 4 5 
1 
Yönetim iç kontrol sisteminin etkin bir şekilde 
çalışmasını destekleyip bu yaklaşımının şirket 






















İç kontrol amaçlarını gerçeklestirebilmek 











Denetim komitesi iç kontrol sistemini 
etkileyebilecek is risklerini sürekli gözlemlemek 
amacı ile yeterli kaynak ve zaman ayırmaktadır. 
5 
Çalısanların görev, yetki ve sorumlulukları açık 
ve net olarak belirlenip, sürekli olarak 
güncellenmektedir. 
3. İç kontrol sistemi içerisinde risk yönetimi ile ilgili olarak aşağıdaki 
ifadelerene ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz. 
1- Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum 2- Katılmıyorum 3- Ne katılıyorum ne 
katılmıyorum 4-Katılıyorum 5- Kesinlikle Katılıyorum 
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1 2 3 4 5 









i Riski yönetmek ve etkilerini hafifletmek için 









Yönetim ve çalısanlar hangi risklerin yönetim 
tarafından kabul edilebilir olduğunu tam olarak 
anlamışlardır. 
9 
Süreç ve kontroller değişen risklere uygun olarak 
sürekli güncellenmektedir. 
4. İç kontrol sistemi içerisinde oluşturulmuş kontrol prosedürleri 
açısından aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz. 
1- Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum 2- Katılmıyorum 3- Ne katılıyorum ne 
katılmıyorum 4-Katılıyorum 5- Kesinlikle Katılıyorum 













İş süreçlerinin analizine dayalı her süreç ve 














Kayıtların ve varlıkların kaybolmasını 
sınırlayan, hileyi önleyen kontroller mevcuttur. 
(Fiziksel kontroller ve görevlerin ayrımı gibi.) 
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Yapılan işlemlerin kaydı yapılıp işlemi 
gerçekleştiren ve kontrol eden tarafından ayrı 













Politika ve prosedür klav uzlarında tanımlanan 














Yasal düzenlemelerdeki değişiklikler yönetim 
tarafından iç kontrol sistemine zamanında ve 
tam olarak aktarılmaktadır. 
5. İç kontrol sistemi içerisinde isletmenin IT alt yapısı ve işletme içi 
iletişim ile ilgili aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı 
belirtiniz. 
1- Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum 2- Katılmıyorum 3- Ne katılıyorum ne 
katılmıyorum 4-Katılıyorum 5- Kesinlikle Katılıyorum 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 
Tüm çalışanlar tarafından anlaşılan ve 
desteklenen bir iç kontrol ortak dil yapısı 
mevcuttur. 
17 
Finansal raporlamaya temel oluşturan bilginin 
doğruluğunu garanti edecek prosedürler 
oluşturulmuştur. 
18 
Birbirinden bağımsız sistemler arasında akan 
verinin doğru bir şekilde aktarıldığına dair 
kontroller mevcuttur. 
19 
I T alt yapısında oluşabilecek önemli bir 
aksaklığa karsı oluşturulmuş, sürekli 
güncellenen bir acil durum planı mevcuttur. 
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6. İç kontrol sisteminin gözetimi açısından aşağıdaki ifadelere ne 
ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz. 
1- Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum 2- Katılmıyorum 3- Ne katılıyorum ne 
katılmıyorum 4-Katılıyorum 5- Kesinlikle Katılıyorum 
1 2 3 4 5 
20 
İç kontrol sisteminin etkinliği yönetim 








İç kontrol sisteminin denetimini yapan birimin 
gözlemci rolü ile çatışacak operasyonel 







Organizasyonun amaç ve planları ışığında 
oluşturulmuş performans ölçütleri 
kullanılmaktadır. 
7. Şu anda çalıştığınız bankaya ilişkin aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde 
katıldığınızı belirtiniz. 
1- Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum 2- Katılmıyorum 3- Ne katılıyorum ne 
katılmıyorum 4-Katılıyorum 5- Kesinlikle Katılıyorum 














































Bankada faaliyetler yasa ve düzenlemelere 
uygun olarak gerçekleştirilmektedir. 
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